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REPRESENTING MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS
IN CLOSE CORPORATIONS UNDER
MODERN BUSINESS CORPORATION ACTS*
JOSEPH EDWARD OLSON**
"When you're up to your ass
in alligators,
it's hard to remember you
came to drain the swamp. ' '
Counsel who have represented minority shareholders under any mod-
em corporation statute based on the Model Business Corporation Act,2
will smile slyly at the above quotation. Passage through the thicket of
problems that such representation presents is a learning experience never
to be forgotten. Counsel will have found a statute strongly biased in
favor of management and the corporation's majority shareholders,3 a
common law of corporations which until recently turned a cold shoulder
to the legitimate needs of minority shareholders,' and if the counselor
* Copyright © 1986 by J. Edward Olson.
** Visiting Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law (Professor of Law, Ham-
line University School of Law). A.B., University of Notre Dame (1967); J.D. with distinction, Duke
University (1970); LL.M. (Taxation), University of Florida (1981). Member California and Minne-
sota bars.
1. Anonymous.
2. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. 1-1791 (3rd Ed. 1985) (hereinafter referred to as MODEL
ACT ANNOT.).
3. E.g., the board of directors controls shareholder access to choices about a number of impor-
tant matters. Unless the board puts the issue before the shareholders, the shareholders are barred
from taking action to amend the articles of incorporation (id. at § 10.03(b)), approve a merger or
share exchange (id. at § 11.03(b)) approve a sale of all assets (id. at § 12.02(b)), or voluntarily dis-
solve the corporation (id. at § 14.02(b)). Under the REv. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT (1984) (hereinaf-
ter cited as MODEL ACT) a majority shareholder will have to exercise at most three options, by
appropriate provisions in the articles of incorporation, to achieve a corporate structure which meets
his needs. These options are: authorize directors to declare share dividends in shares of one class for
distribution to another class (id. at § 6.23), authorize the directors to ignore redemption preferences,
if any, in declaring dividends (id. at § 6.40), and authorize "blank" stock whereby the board can set
the rights and preferences of new shares without further shareholder approval (id. at § 6.02).
4. Subject to two developments, traditional corporate law favors the control group and allows
wide latitude to "freeze-out" and oppress the minority shareholders. From the 1930's through
1960's the courts discovered that close corporations were functionally different organisms with dra-
matically different needs for planning flexibility. See, eg., Galler v. Galler, 32 Ill. 2d 16, 203 N.E.2d
577 (1965); Hart v. Bell, 222 Minn. 69, 23 N.W.2d 375 (1946); Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 199
N.E. 641 (1936). This led to a series of decisions authorizing departures, by varying degrees, from
Washington University Open Scholarship
508 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 64:507
were a corporate specialist, his own "cultural" bias toward his usual cli-
ent class-those in control of the enterprise.
I. STATUTORY PHILOSOPHY
The 1984 Revised Model Business Corporation Act may be usefully
contrasted with other modem statutes in order to dramatize some of the
tacit policy decisions made by the Model Act's drafters. The 1981 Min-
nesota Business Corporation Act5 is particularly suitable for this com-
parison because it was drafted contemporaneously with the revised
Model Act and both statutes are based on the 1969 Model Act. In addi-
tion, the statutes differ dramatically in their treatment of important close
corporation issues.6
The Model Act is drafted with the large, publicly held corporation as
its paradigm. Although its overall flexibility lends itself to alterations to
meet the needs of the close corporation, the basic statute does not do so.
The Model Statutory Close Corporation Supplement7 partially fills this
statutory "gap." That statute, however, is merely supplementary,8 leav-
ing the Model Act's basic pro-management bias intact, and the Supple-
ment's applicability depends upon election by a supramajority of the
the "corporate norm" by way of special clauses in the articles, bylaws, or shareholders' agreements.
The object of these cases was to provide flexible planning tools to meet foreseen needs. See Cary,
How Illinois Corporations May Enjoy Partnership Advantages: Planning for the Closely Held Firm, 48
Nw. U.L. REV. 427 (1953).
In the 1970's and 1980's the courts have further recognized that flexibility in planning is only part
of the answer for close corporations. Minority shareholders need self-effectuating protections when
planning is absent or overwhelmed by unforeseen events. Thus fiduciary duties have been held to
exist among all shareholders and denial of the minority's reasonable expectations has led to remedial
action. See Olson, A Statutory Elixir for the Oppression Malady, 36 MERCER L. REV. 627 (1985)
[hereinafter cited as Olson, A Statutory Elixir].
5. MINN. STAT. ch. 302A (1984).
6. A corporation that is closely held will exhibit the following characteristics: (a) a small
number of stockholders; (b) no ready market for the corporate stock; and (c) substantial direct
participation by the majority shareholders in the management, direction, and operations of the cor-
poration. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 585-86, 328 N.E.2d 505, 511, (1975).
The leading commentator on close corporation law and practice, after considering numerous alterna-
tives, draws the line on the basis of whether a ready market exists for the corporation's shares-thus
allowing a minority shareholder an escape from the power of the majority and management. F.
O'NEAL, 1 CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 1.02 (2d ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as F. O'NEAL]. See also
N.Y. Bus CORP. ACT § 1104-a(a). This is the most appropriate definition of the term "close corpo-
ration" since the same potential for abuse exists whenever the minority shareholder cannot fairly
retrieve his investment at will. See Olson, A Statutory Elixir ,supra note 4, at 627-28.
7. MODEL ACT ANNOT., supra note 2, at 1803-1879.
8. MODEL STATUTORY CLOSE CORPORATION SUPPLEMENT § 2 [hereinafter cited as CLOSE
CORP. SUPP.); MODEL AT ANNOT., supra note 2, at 1803-1879.
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shareholders.9 The Supplement contains no provisions of advantage to a
majority shareholder. If a single shareholder or a small, strongly unified
group, controls a majority of the shares, the minority shareholders will
rarely have sufficient bargaining power to cause an election.10
The Supplement contains two provisions of utmost importance to mi-
nority shareholders-specific authorization for shareholder control
agreements which are operative on the director or corporation level,'1
and expanded opportunity for judicial intervention when those in control
of the corporation have mistreated12 minority shareholders.13 Similar
provisions do not appear in the Model Act although similar results may
be achieved with diligent planning. On the other hand, in a jurisdiction
which has enacted both Acts, courts may erroneously conclude that the
existence of these provisions in the Supplement precludes developing
similar protections under the Model Act.14
The status of shareholder control agreements under the Model Act is
unclear. The Act specifically validates shareholder voting agreements,
15
which are effective at the shareholder level, but is silent as to shareholder
control agreements, which seek to exert control over the directors or the
corporation. This silence may raise a negative inference that other agree-
ments are not valid.' 6 In opposition to this negative inference stands the
interpretive rule that statutes must be clear in order to overrule common
9. CLOSE CORP. SuPP., supra note 8, at § 3(a). The restriction that only corporations "having
50 or fewer shareholders" may elect to become statutory close corporations further reduces the
usefulness of the Supplement (although once the election is made, the Supplement provides no upper
limit on the number of shareholders). Id. at § 3(b).
10. One may predict, with some assurance, that the Supplement will seldom be elected. See
Dickson, The Florida Close Corporation Act: An Experiment that Failed, 21 MIAMI U.L. REv. 842
(1967); FLORIDA LAWS 1975, c. 75-250 § 139 (repealing FLA. STAT. §§ 608.70-.77).
11. CLOSE CORP. SupP., supra note 8, at § 20. Compare MINN. STAT. § 302A.457 (1984).
12. "Mistreatment" is a general term that encompasses all acts of those in control which leave
other shareholders at a disadvantage.
13. CLOSE CORP. SuPP., supra note 8, at §§ 40-43. Compare MINN. STAT. § 302A.751 (1984).
14. Toner v. Baltimore Envelope Co., 304 Md. 256, 498 A.2d 642, 653-54 (Md. 1985). But see
Zion v Kurtz, 50 N.Y.2d 92, 405 N.E.2d 681 (1980) (existence of elective close corporation provi-
sions indicates no public policy against general use of shareholder control agreements).
15. MODEL ACT, supra note 3, at § 7.31. Voting agreements are sometimes referred to as
"shareholder pooling agreements."
16. Compare CLOSE CORP. SuPP., supra note 8, at § 20(h) (specific statutory authority for cer-
tain agreements does not prohibit use of other types). The "Special Comment-Close Corporations"
which formerly appeared in the Model Act's Official Comments has been moved to Annotation
following § 20 of the Close Corporation Supplement. MODEL ACT ANNOT., supra note 2, at 1863-
67. An inference from this move is that the contents of the Special Comment may no longer apply to
the Model Act itself.
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law, and the long line of cases approving shareholder control agreements
in close corporations.17 The case law on this issue is strong enough to
overcome any negative inference from the mere authorization of certain
agreements.
The provisions of the Model Act which specifically authorize limita-
tion of the board's powers and regulation of the business and affairs of
the corporation by provisions in the articles of incorporation present a
more serious obstacle."8 Although these provisions indicate that the
Model Act rejects the concept of "inherent areas" of authority for the
board of shareholders, the issue remains as to the efficacy of a share-
holder control agreement which is not embodied in the articles. Once
again a negative inference may arise that "limitations" 9 outside the arti-
cles are invalid.20 One commentator on the Texas Business Corporation
Act, a model for the shareholder control agreement provision of the Sup-
plement,21 indicates that such invalidity does result.22 However, the
Model Act Annotation leaves the issue open.23 Once again, the language
of the Model Act is more in the nature of a safeharbor, describing one
approved technique, than a derogation of the common law.24 Surely, if
exclusivity had been intended, the drafters could have clearly so speci-
fied.25 Thus the common law shareholder control agreement should sur-
17. Westland Capital Corp. v. Lucht Eng'g, Inc., 308 N.W.2d 709, 712 (Minn. 1981); cases
cited supra note 4; F. O'NEAL, supra note 6, at § 5.24; Z. CAVITCH, 6 BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS-
WiTH TAX PLANNING § 114.01[3] (1985); Annot., Validity of Stockholders' Agreement Allegedly
Infringing on Directors' Management Powers-Modern Cases, 15 A.L.R.4TH 1078 (1982).
18. MODEL Acr, supra note 3, at §§ 2.02(b)(2)(ii)& (iii), 8.01(b), 8.01(c). The Official Com-
ment to § 20 of the Close Corporation Supplement states "[General Corporation] statutes ... in
general do not authorize as much flexibility [in a shareholders' control agreement], particularly with
respect to restriction on the normal power of directors." MODEL ACT ANNOT., supra note 2, at
1835.
19. MODEL AcT., supra note 3, at § 8.01(b).
20. The Official Comment to § 8.01(b) states: "[This provision] was added to make clear that
corporations with boards of directors may reserve power to the shareholders in the Articles of Incor-
poration if that is deemed appropriate." (emphasis added).
21. MODEL AcT ANNOT., supra note 2, at 1836.
22. Johnson, Not With My Shares You Don'tl Close Corporation Control Devices Under Texas
Law: Problems and Drafting, 26 S. TEX. L. REV. 201, 214-15 (1985).
23. The Annotation to § 7.31 (shareholder voting agreements) states that "language similar to
that appearing in section 8.01(b) of the 1984 Model Act may validate shareholder control agree-
ments generally." MODEL AcT ANNOT., supra note 2, at § 7.13.
24. See supra note 17.
25. The failure of the Model Act to clarify this important point is a significant defect. Compare
MINN. STAT. § 302A.457 (1984) (authorizing control agreements for all corporations subject only to
the practical limitation that all shareholders must be parties).
[Vol. 64:507
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vive enactment of the Model Act. In addition, the specific authority for
limitations in the articles would seem to validate a provision in the arti-
cles which expressly authorizes shareholder entry into control agree-
ments.26 Such an arrangement would provide public notice that the
internal power structure of the corporation may differ from that gener-
ally provided in the Model Act27 and allow creditors and other parties
the opportunity to inquire as to the specific provisions of such an
agreement.
The Minnesota Act takes a diametrically opposite approach. Under
the Minnesota statute the shareholder control agreement 28 is the central
planning document governing the affairs of a close corporation and its
shareholders. So long as all shareholders join in the agreement, the doc-
ument may relate to "the control of any phase of the business and affairs
of the corporation, its liquidation and dissolution, or the relations among
shareholders." 29 The Minnesota Act provides no "corporate norm"
when a control agreement is prepared and the shareholders may there-
fore usurp traditional prerogatives of the board. The agreement may
cover any matter connected with the corporation except that it may not
be inconsistent with the few mandatory provisions of the Act or reduce
the protections provided in the minimal provisions of the statute. 30 Pro-
visions otherwise modifiable in the articles or bylaws may be included in
a control agreement and the agreement may encompass matters other-
wise covered by a shareholder voting agreement. The shareholder con-
trol agreement is the key document into which all other devices for
allocating control and financial return are tied through incorporation by
reference. Under the Minnesota statute, the shareholders have clear au-
thority to design their own scheme of corporate governance.
26. MODEL ACT, supra note 3, at § 8.01(b) provides that the board will manage the corporation
"subject to any limitation in the articles" and § 8.01(c) provides, for corporations having 50 or fewer
shareholders, that the shareholders may "limit the authority of a board... by describing.., who
will perform some or all of the board's duties." (emphasis added).
27. The existence of a public record is a significant policy behind the use of optional article
provisions under MODEL ACT, supra note 3, at § 2.02(b)(2). See Official Comment to § 2.02,
MODEL ACT ANNOT., supra note 2, at 108.
28. MINN. STAT. § 302A.457 (1984). The drafters of the Minnesota Act accepted the author's
proposal to clearly distinguish between shareholders' voting agreements, MINN. STAT. § 302A.455,
and shareholders' control agreements, MINN. STAT. § 302A.457. See OLSON, CORPORATE PRAC-
TICE: PROBLEM AREAS UNDER THE MINNESOTA CORPORATION STATUTE (Minnesota CLE 1978).
29. MINN. STAT. § 302A.457 subd. 1 (1984).
30. The mandatory and minimal provisions of the Minnesota Act are identified in OLSON &
SPENCER, SHAREHOLDER PLANNING 173-175 (Minnesota CLE 1984). See generally infra notes 65-
72 and accompanying text.
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With its large, public corporation viewpoint, the Model Act does not
deal adequately with the problem of minority shareholder abuse in a
close corporation. The Act simply carries over the provision of the 1969
Act authorizing judicial intervention when the acts of those in control of
the corporation are "oppressive."'" Although a few courts have recently
begun to interpret oppression so as to provide effective relief, 32 most
courts continue to require such a high quantum of bad conduct on the
part of majority shareholders that relief is seldom provided.3 3 The Close
Corporation Supplement expands the grounds on which judicial inter-
vention may be based to include acts by those in control of the corpora-
tion which are oppressive or "unfairly prejudicial" to the shareholder in
his capacity as a director, officer or shareholder of the corporation.34
Furthermore, the Supplement provides the court with an array of reme-
dial tools short of involuntary dissolution of the corporation including a
buy-out of the petitioner.35 The non-controlling shareholders will only
have access to the Supplement's broader protections, however, if the ma-
jority shareholder or shareholder group chooses to make these protec-
tions available.
The Minnesota Act makes these protections available to every share-
holder.3 6 The legislature was convinced that minority shareholder rights
and protections were too important to be left to the mere desire or elec-
tion of the majority. 37 The full range of equitable remedies, up to and
including involuntary dissolution,38 is available where those in control
31. 1969 MODEL AcT § 97(a); MODEL Acr § 14.20(2)(ii).
32. See, eg., Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch Co., 198 Mont. 201, 645 P.2d 929 (1982); Exadaktilos v.
Cinnaminson Realty Co., 167 N.J. Super. 141, 400 A.2d 554 (1979), afid, 173 N.J. Super. 559, 414
A.2d 994 (1980); Gardstein v. Kemp & Beatly, Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 63, 473 N.E.2d 1173 (1984); Meisel-
man v. Meiselman, 309 N.C. 279, 307 S.E.2d 551 (1983); Masinter v. Webco Co., 262 S.E.2d 433
(W. Va. 1980).
33. See, e.g., Fix v. Fix Material Co., 538 S.W.2d 351 (Mo. App. 1976); Baker v. Commercial
Body Builders, Inc., 264 Ore. 614, 507 P.2d 387 (1973).
34. CLOSE CORP. SUPP., supra note 8, at § 40(a)(1). The "unfairly prejudicial" standard for
judicial intervention is the present test in England (The [British] Company Act, 1980, § 75) and
several states. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 751 Subd. 1(b)(2) (1984); N.J. REV. STAT. § 14A:12-7(I)(c)
(Supp. 1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-21-150(a)(4)(B) (Supp. 1982).
35. CLOSE CORP. SUPP., supra note 8, at §§ 41-43.
36. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751 (1984).
37. The Legislature soundly rejected the elective approach of the Close Corporation Supple-
ment. See Olson, Statutory Changes Improve Position of Minority Shareholders in Closely-Held Cor-
porations, 53-1 HENNEPIN LAW. 10 (1983).
38. A court may order the buy-out of a complaining shareholder pursuant to subdivision 2 of
§ 751 (when grounds for dissolution have not been shown) if the corporation is "closely held," i.e.,
has 35 or fewer shareholders. See MINN. STAT. § 302A.011 subd. 6a (1984). Compare In re Villa
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol64/iss2/6
REPRESENTING MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS
have acted in an "unfairly prejudicial" manner toward the complaining
shareholders in their capacities "as shareholders, directors, or officers [of
a corporation] or as employees of a closely-held corporation."39 Further-
more, the Minnesota Act mandates that all shareholders of a closely held
corporation owe fiduciary duties to each other in the operation of the
corporation and requires that the reasonable expectations of the share-
holders be respected.' This represents the first legislative enactment of
what has now become the universal rule of the American common law of
corporations.41 Thus, the position of minority shareholders is more se-
cure under the Minnesota Act than it is under the Model Act.
II. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Representation of a minority shareholder or a group of them fre-
quently presents the lawyer with personal and ethical issues. The per-
sonal issue arises from a lawyer's natural tendency to identify with the
"cultural" bias of his usual client class and the need to cast aside those
psychological tendencies when acting in a capacity opposite to his usual
role. With the possible exception of academics, "corporate" lawyers rep-
resent and identify with management and controlling shareholders.
Their continuing workload is under the control of those groups. Most
often, lawyers in general practice, probate specialists and litigators repre-
sent minority shareholders. Thus, a corporate practitioner called upon
to represent minority shareholders needs to recognize that he may have
psychological "blind spots" which could adversely affect the quality of
his representation. This is not to say that the lawyer cannot change gears
and bring his experience and particular competence to bear from a new
prospective. It is merely to point out that the lawyer should be conscious
of the problem and take positive steps to alleviate it.
The ethical issue arises because all of the founding entrepreneurs or a
Maria, 312 N.W.2d 921, 923 (Minn. 1981) (buy-out as an alternative to dissolution). Grounds for
dissolution need not be shown as a predicate for granting any lesser relief. Id. at § 302A.751 subd.
3b (1986).
39. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751 subd. l(b)(2) (1984). The Minnesota Act like that of New Jersey
extends protection to shareholders of closely held corporations in their capacity as employees. Job
rights are often among the most important inducements for the minority's investment. See Report of
the Corporation Law Revision Committee, N.J. REV. STAT. § 14A, at 31 (Supp. 1983). Compare
Close Corp. Supp., supra note 8, at § 40(a)(l). The discussion draft of the Supplement included
.'employee" but that status was removed from the final version. See 38 Bus. Law. 1031, 1032 (1983).
40. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751 subd. 3a (1984).
41. See Olson, A Statutory Elixir, supra note 4, at 646-58.
Number 2]
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number of prospective minority shareholders usually will approach the
lawyer seeking group representation. Inherent in this situation is a con-
flict of interest of potentially serious proportions. Although the entrepre-
neurs are united against the outside world, they are competitors with
respect to the sharing of managerial control, current profit participation,
and ultimate investment recapture. Their legal interests are not aligned
and may be contradictory at various points. Because of the numerous
planning options available under the Model Act, multiple representation
has become much more difficult to achieve successfully. Imagine going
through the thirty-five point checklist in the Official Comment to section
2.02 of the Model Act with a majority and minority shareholder at the
same time!42 In providing competent advice, the lawyer must inform
each client of what the statute and common law provide relative to that
client's position and discuss commonly occurring negative scenarios so
that the client's expectations and desires with respect to the venture can
be fully articulated and appropriate steps taken to insure those needs will
be met.43 Often counsel will be unable to accomplish this task for all of
the entrepreneurs as a group.
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct recognize these issues
but give the lawyer little effective guidance. Two overlapping provisions
of the Model Rules cover the problems presented by group representa-
tion. Under Rule 1.7, when representation of one client may be materi-
ally adverse or materially limit representation of another, the lawyer may
act for both parties only if:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely
affected; and (2) the client consents after consultation. When representa-
tion of multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation
shall include explanation of the implications of the common representation
and the advantages and risks involved.44
The Comment to the Rule indicates that relevant factors to consider are
the likelihood that an actual conflict will occur and, if it does, whether
the conflict will materially interfere with the lawyer's professional judg-
42. MODEL AcT. ANNOT., supra note 2, at 109-111. The Minnesota Act provides over 50
specific choices in its nonexclusive checklist. See MINN. STAT. § 302A.111 (1984).
43. See Hetherington, Special Characteristics, Problems, and Needs of the Close Corporation,
1969 U. ILL. L.F. 10, 17.
44. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.7(b) (1983) [hereinafter cited as
MODEL RULES]. "Consultation" means "communication of information reasonably sufficient to
permit the client to appreciate the significance of the matter in question." Id. at Preamble.
[Vol. 64:507
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ment.4 - If the risk of adverse effect is minimal and the clients consent,
the lawyer may undertake the multiple representation. However, the
lawyer has a continuing duty to monitor the situation. When the conflict
rises to the point where a disinterested lawyer would conclude that the
clients should no longer agree to share the lawyer's loyalty, the clients'
consent no longer suffices and the representation must be terminated.46
Rule 2.241 is new and may offer the lawyer additional opportunity to
act with regard to multiple clients. This rule introduces the concept of
the lawyer acting as an intermediary.48 Rule 2.2 requires the lawyer to
determine that intermediation is appropriate and to secure each client's
informed consent. The lawyer must also ensure that he remains impar-
tial and that intermediation remains appropriate for all the parties in-
volved. This rule allows the lawyer to represent multiple parties as an
intermediary49 when their interests are "substantially although not en-
tirely compatible."5 The lawyer, however, must remain impartial as he
has parallel duties to provide loyal and diligent representation to each
45. Id. at Rule 1.7, Comment. A conflict will "materially interfere" with the lawyer's profes-
sional judgment if it causes the lawyer to fail to consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate
course of action for one client because of the interests of another. Id.
46. Id. The responsibility to cause termination is the lawyer's.
47. Rule 2.2 allows a lawyer to
(a) ... act as intermediary between clients if: (1) the lawyer consults with each client
concerning the implications of the common representation, including the advantages
and risks involved, and the effect of the attorney-client privileges, and obtains each
client's consent to the common representation; (2) the lawyer reasonably believes that
the matter can be resolved on terms compatible with the client's best interests, that
each client will be able to make adequately informed decisions in the matter and that
there is little risk of material prejudice to the interests of any of the clients if the con-
templated resolution is unsuccessful; and (3) the lawyer reasonably believes that the
common representation can be undertaken impartially and without improper effect on
other responsibilities the lawyer has to any of the clients.
(b) while acting as intermediary, the lawyer shall consult with each client concerning the
decisions to be made and the considerations relevant in making them, so that each
client can make adequately informed decisions.
(c) A lawyer shall withdraw as intermediary if any of the clients so requests, or if any
other conditions stated in paragraph (a) is no longer satisfied. Upon withdrawal, the
lawyer shall not continue to represent any of the clients in the matter that was the
subject of the intermediation.
Id. at Rule 2.2.
48. One example of intermediation is assisting in the organization of a business in which two or
more clients are entrepreneurs. Id. at Rule 2.2, Comment.
49. An intermediary seeks to resolve potentially conflicting interests by developing the shared
interests of the parties. In intermediation, the client ordinarily must assume greater responsibility
for decisions than he would need to do if he had independent representation. Id. at Rule 2.2,
Comment.
50. Id. The responsibility to terminate representation is the lawyer's.
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client. These duties retain their full vigor. As under Rule 1.7, the attor-
ney must monitor the client's ability to make adequately informed
choices and ensure that material prejudice does not result. If the client
should no longer consent, then his earlier consent no longer validates the
multiple representation.
Important issues these Rules and Comments raise include: whether the
interest is actually, as distinguished from potentially, differing; whether
the difference of interests is so great that the independent judgment of the
attorney on behalf of each client might be adversely affected; and
whether the attorney's representation of each will, nevertheless, be com-
petent. Subsidiary issues include standards for determining when the de-
gree of divergence is too great, and when the level of legal service is
adequate. Faced with these vague standards, the attorney might consider
refusing to represent any of the parties until all the other parties procure
separate legal advice. Experience indicates, however, that this approach
is generally unworkable because the prospective clients most often will
view the attempt to require separate representation as impractical and
unnecessary. Entrepreneurs see their interest in successful initiation of
the enterprise as overshadowing all "lawyers' quibbling," and may re-
gard the attempt to require separate representation as simply another
example of excessive legal expense.
Another approach is to choose one of the parties as "the client" and
tell the other members of the entrepreneurial group that they should not
look to the attorney for representation. This approach, however, begs
the question, because the entire group will probably continue to believe
that the attorney is putting the deal together for all of them. This belief
is nearly impossible to dispel. Even if the other members of the group
are provided a written warning in the strongest terms, they will as a prac-
tical, if not legal, matter continue to trust the attorney. The situation is
especially difficult when more than one of the group has a prior client
relationship with the attorney. In such a case, all former clients may
presume no impairment of their representation, and the burden is on the
attorney to break the bond of trust that the prior representation has
created.51
How are attorneys to protect their clients and themselves under these
circumstances? Effective protective action appears to have two aspects-
disclosure and quality assurance. When undertaking this type of multi-
51. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Keller, 17 Ill. App. 2d 44, 149 N.E.2d 107 (1977).
[Vol. 64:507
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ple representation, the attorney shoulders the burden of assessing and
making full disclosure of all the facts and circumstances concerning the
differing interests. This disclosure should include: any actual or poten-
tial differences in interest among the clients; the scope of those differ-
ences; the limitations which those differences might place on the
attorney's representation of each client, i.e., how the attorney's advice
and conduct may be modified due to the differences; and the severity of
the conflict resulting from those differing interests. Simply stating that
the clients may have differing interests is not enough. The clients should
also be informed that the attorney may at some point have to completely
withdraw from representation of all or any of them if a conflict develops
which is severe enough that the attorney can no longer adequately repre-
sent all interests.
If all of the prospective clients give informed consent to representation
by a single attorney, the lawyer may begin to advise the group.52 The
attorney is, however, under a continuing duty to assure the quality of his
performance. In this context, adequate representation requires neither
greater nor lesser care than the zealous protection of individual interests
which each client would expect if that client's interests were the attor-
ney's sole responsibility.53 The attorney must point out at each stage of
the negotiations the relative advantages and disadvantages of alternate
courses of action to each client, so that the clients can agree on the
choices to be made.
The unique circumstances of each case affect the adequacy of represen-
tation. These circumstances include the parties' relative bargaining
power, the nature of the business, and the severity of any discord which
arises among the group. If one party persists in demanding unfairly ad-
vantageous arrangements with regard to a particular item or if one client
is obviously unable to effectively protect himself without independent
representation, the attorney should terminate representation of the entire
group. The test is that of objective fairness to each: Would independent
representation have resulted in a substantially better deal for any of the
clients? 4 The significant consideration is that each client accepts a deal
52. The consent should be in a signed writing. See Appendix, infra p.-
53. Hill v. Okay Const. Co., 312 Minn. 324, 252 N.W.2d 107 (1977). See also Evans v. Blesi,
345 N.W.2d 775 (Minn. App. 1984) (lawyers who represented corporation were in conflict of interest
position when they also represented majority shareholder in attempt to freeze-out minority share-
holder; therefore, their advice to the majority shareholder was not within lawyer-client privilege as
to the minority shareholders).
54. Crest Investment Trust, Inc. v. Comstock, 23 Md. App. 280, 327 A.2d 891 (1974).
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for business reasons, and not because the lawyer failed to competently
and zealously represent that client. When this result is achieved, the cli-
ents have received adequate representation.
Two general guidelines can be developed from application of the
Model Rules to common close corporation settings. First, only in the
most unusual circumstances may a single attorney represent a majority
shareholder (or controlling group) and also represent a minority share-
holder (or group) regarding the "deal" between them. 5 Even if such
representation is undertaken with utmost care, disaster for the attorney is
so probable that this situation should be avoided. On the other hand, a
single attorney often can successfully represent a group of minority
shareholders in negotiations in which each faces substantially the same
risks in joining the venture because of the uniform effect of various con-
trol devices and other techniques on each.56 Significant disparities
among clients in age, health or business experience render multiple repre-
sentation unwise.5 7 Even when informed consent is given, the attorney
would be well advised to formally review the multiple representation on
an annual basis in order to assure himself that continued representation
is appropriate under the Model Rules."
III. SCOPE OF PERMISSIBLE PLANNING UNDER THE MODEL ACT
Modern corporation statutes, including both the Model Act and the
Minnesota Act, are enabling acts designed to foster flexibility in devising
the appropriate structure for a particular corporation. All but a very few
of the provisions of the statutes can be modified in their application. The
problem for the attorney-planner is to determine which provisions are
55. One might attempt this if the clients were extremely "savvy" about both business and legal
matters and if the representation would not be continuing or the clients have independent counsel
readily available to them.
56. Ghinger, Shareholders'Agreements in Closely Held Corporations, 4 U. BALT. L. REv. 211,
213-14 (1975).
57. Age or health disparities are especially crucial if the attorney's task is to develop a buy-sell
agreement regarding corporate stock. See generally Helms v. Duckworth, 249 F.2d 482 (D.C. Cir.
1957).
58. Lawyers who run afoul of the conflict of interest prohibition most often side with the
stronger client over time and fail to properly monitor the need of the other client or clients for
independent counsel. See Evans v. Blesi, 345 N.W.2d 775 (Minn. App. 1984) (counsel representing a
corporation assisted majority shareholder in planning a "freeze-out" of the minority; held: counsel
were in conflict of interest position and had duty to advise minority shareholder regarding corporate
matters, i.e., the "freeze-out"). See also In re Brownstein, 288 Or. 83, 602 P.2d 655 (1979); National
Texture Corp. v. Hynes, 282 N.W.2d 890 (Minn. 1979).
[Vol. 64:507
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol64/iss2/6
REPRESENTING MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS
not modifiable at all and which allow for only limited modification. The
Model Act does not resolve this problem of identifying what to change
and how to accomplish the modification.
The Official Comment to Section 2.02 of the Model Act lists thirty-five
modifications which can be made only in the articles or only in the by-
laws,59 but these lists are not exclusive.' Other portions of the Official
Comments invite additional modifications to meet needs of close corpo-
rations but do not specify how those changes are to be validly accom-
plished.61 Furthermore, several sections of the Model Act specifically
authorize or preclude modifications,62 usually with a comment that no
inferences are to be drawn regarding other sections because these can or
cannot be modified.63 Unlike the Minnesota Act, the Model Act does
not authorize sweeping deviations from the "corporate norm" in a unani-
mous shareholder control agreement."4 The Model Act, therefore, pro-
vides no clear answer to the question: What provisions of the Model Act
cannot be modified, in whole or in part, by various corporate governance
documents? The following analysis, however, can resolve this dilemma.
A rational basis can be constructed for determining the permissible
modifications of the provisions of the Model Act by recognizing that
three types of provisions are present in the Act: mandatory sections; 65
minimal sections,66 which may be altered to enhance but not reduce the
statute's protection; and presumptive sections,67 which often expressly
59. MODEL AcT, supra note 2, at § 2.02, Official Comment. The Minnesota Act lists 38 such
modifications as well as 20 optional modifications (those most frequently made) for a total of 58
listed, but nonexhaustive, choices. MINN. STAT. § 302A. 111 (1984).
60. Unlisted options that shareholders may elect only in the articles include those authorized
by §§ 3.01, 3.02, 6.21, 10.01, 10.20 and 12.01(b) of the Model Act. Unlisted options that may be
elected only in the articles or bylaws include those authorized by §§ 7.02, 8.11 and 14.02(e) of the
Model Act.
61. See, e.g., MODEL AcT, supra note 3, at §§ 8.07, 14.30, 16.20, Official Comments.
62. See MODEL ACT, supra note 3, at §§ 6.21(a) (can be modified), 8.03(b) & (c) (cannot be
modified), 10.04(d) (cannot be denied), 16.02(d) (cannot be abolished or limited).
63. Id. at §§ 6.21, 10.04, 16.02, Official Comments. Inexplicably, no statement regarding per-
missible inferences is contained in the comment to § 8.03.
64. See MINN. STAT. § 302A.457 subd. 2 (1984). To statutorily validate a shareholder's con-
trol agreement under the Model Act, the corporation must elect to be governed by the Model Statu-
tory Close Corporation Supplement. See CLOSE CORP. Supp., supra note 2, at § 20. See also supra
notes 15-27 and accompanying text.
65. See infra notes 69-72.
66. See, e.g., MODEL AcT, supra note 2, at §§ 6.21, 6.30, 6.40, 7.02, 7.04, 7.20, 7.25, 7.27, 7.30,
7.31, 8.06, 8.08, 8.24, 8.31, 8.32, 8.51-.58, 10.04, 10.20-.22, 11.01, 11.02, 12.01, 12.02, 13.02, 16.01,
16.02, 16.20, 16.21.
67. See supra notes 59 and 60.
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provide for change. The mandatory sections may be further subdivided
into two classes: those not subject to modification even by unanimous
shareholder action, and those subject to modification by unanimous
shareholder action, but not by majority shareholder action. The question
is how to identify the provisions falling into each of the mandatory
classes because action to modify those provisions will be invalid.68
Three series of sections are not subject to change even by unanimous
shareholder action. They are provisions which form the "skeleton" of
the corporation,69 provisions which are addressed to the courts, 70 and
provisions which provide protection to the interests of creditors and
other third parties.71 Provisions which are not subject to limitation by
majority shareholder action are those few sections which provide protec-
tions for the interests of minority shareholders.72
The Model Act also leaves unresolved a second question: How are
legitimate modifications to the corporate structure set out in the Act to
be accomplished? Some guidance is contained in the Official Comment
list of changes that must be accomplished only in the articles or bylaws.
73
Furthermore, the Model Act authorizes optional provisions in the arti-
cles or bylaws74 and shareholder voting agreements. 75 The Model Act
does not specifically validate shareholder control agreements.76 Thus,
the planner is left to common law decisions in his search for a valid loca-
tion for the various modifications which are necessary to protect his cli-
ent's interests.77
68. See Galler v. Galler, 302 N.E.2d at 585; Wilson v. McClenny, 262 N.C. 121, 129, 136
S.E.2d 569, 575 (1964).
69. See, eg., MODEL AcT, supra note 3, at §§ 1.01-.42, 2.01, 1.02(a), 2.03-.06, 4.01.03, 5.01-.04,
6.01(a) (partially), 6.02(b) & (d), 6.03, 6.22 (partially), 6.25, 7.01, 7.21(a) (partially), 8.01 (partially),
8.03(a) (partially), 8.03(b), (c) and (d), 8.25(e), 8.30, 8.33, 8.42, 10.01, 10.05-.09, 11.06, 11.07, 14.01,
14.03, 14.05, 14.20-.23, 16.22.
70. See, e.g., id. at §§ 7.03, 7.40, 8.09, 14.30.
71. See, e.g., id. at §§ 3.04, 6.40(c)(1), 8.32, 14.06, 14.07 (creditors); §§ 6.27(b), 7.22(g) (pur-
chasers without knowledge).
72. E.g., id. at §§ 10.04, 13.02, 13.15-.31.
73. Id. at § 2.02, Official Comment.
74. Id. at § 2.02(b)(2) (articles), § 2.06(b) (bylaws).
75. Id. at § 7.31.
76. See supra notes 15-27 and accompanying text. Under the Minnesota Act, on the other
hand, the shareholders' control agreement is not subject to the "corporate norm" and is the central
planning document into which all other devices are tied. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying
text.
77. The failure of the Model Act to broadly validate shareholders control agreements is a major
defect. Compare CLOSE CORP. SuPP., supra note 8, at § 20.
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The technical methods which planners have traditionally used to
achieve the desired allocation of control and financial return and to
maintain that allocation are:
(1) stock transfer restrictions, (2) shareholder pooling agreements, (3) vot-
ing trusts, (4) irrevocable proxies, (5) cumulative voting provisions, (6) clas-
sification of shares (including provisions for nonvoting or other specialized
types of shares), and (7) shareholder agreements which restrict action by
directors, provide for management of the corporation by the shareholders
or provide for so-called veto powers whereby, through high voting or quo-
rum requirements, minority shareholders may effectively be given a veto
over corporate actions.78
These devises remain available under the Model Act and are discussed in
the materials which follow.
A. Planning Opportunities Using The Articles of Incorporation
Modern analysis views the articles of incorporation as a contract
among the shareholders which sets out the terms of their endeavor and
the hazards which they accept in joining together. Thus the Model Act
provides that the articles may contain any provisions79 regarding "man-
aging the business and regulating the affairs of the corporation ... [or]
defining, limiting, and regulating the powers of the corporation, its board
of directors, and shareholders ... ."8o The articles may contain any con-
trol or financial arrangments upon which the shareholders have decided,
and the articles must contain those modifications which, by virtue of the
substantive provisions of the Model Act, may be made only in the arti-
cles.'1 The list of options provided in the Official Comment may be used
as a "road map" for planning. When representing minority sharehold-
ers, almost every substantive section, both presumptive and minimal,
should be considered for modification because of the strong statutory
bias towards management and controlling shareholders. Although the
potential list of modifications which counsel may find desirable under the
78. W. PAINTER, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS IN BUSINESS PLANNING 22 (2d Ed. 1984).
79, The provisions must not be "inconsistent with law." However, there is no indication as to
when such inconsistency will arise. See supra notes 59-72 and accompanying text.
80. MODEL AcT, supra note 3, at § 2.02(b)(2)(ii) & (iii).
81. The Official Comment to § 2.02 contains a list of 23 options which may be elected only in
the articles. MODEL AcT ANNOT., supra note 2, at 109-10. At least seven other options may be
elected only in the articles. See supra note 60. The Minnesota Act contains a similar nonexclusive
list of 19 options which may be elected only in the articles. MINN. STAT. § 302A.1 11 subd. 2 (1984).
However, under the Minnesota Act even these options may be contained in an unanimous share-
holder control agreement. Id. at § 302A.457.
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circumstances of a particular case is infinite, certain options should be
considered in every case.
1. Include in the articles of incorporation the statement that the
corporation is a statutory close corporation.
In a jurisdiction which has enacted the Model Statutory Close Corpo-
ration Supplement this statement constitutes an election that the Supple-
ment as well as the Model Act governs the corporation. 2
2. Provide that the fiduciary duty and reasonable expectations
doctrines apply to the corporation.
The clear trend in the Anglo-American common law of corporations is
to apply both the fiduciary duty and reasonable expectations doctrines to
close corporations. The case law is, however, not always clear and the
courts have not spoken in all jurisdictions.83 The articles should include
the following statement:
All shareholders of this corporation owe one another a duty to act in an
honest, fair, and reasonable manner in the operation of the corporation and
in their relations toward each other involving the corporation. The share-
holders shall honor the reasonable expectations which they share as those
expectations exist at the inception and develop during the course of the
shareholders' relationship with the corporation and with each other.8"
In no instance should a minority shareholder accept an "anti-Donahue
clause" which provides that neither the fiduciary duty nor the reasonable
expectations doctrine are applicable to this corporation and its share-
holders.8 5 The controlling shareholders should, instead, be required to
specifically identify and negotiate an agreement as to each circumstance
in which they feel unable to act in an honest, fair and reasonable manner
respecting the reasonable8 6 expectations of the minority. 7
82. CLOSE CORP. Supp., supra note 8, at § 3(a). The Close Corporation Supplement provides:
a prepared form of stock transfer restrictions and a buy-out on the death of a shareholder; clear
authorization for shareholder control agreements and for article provisions giving a shareholder
power to dissolve the corporation at will; and access to enhance equitable relief for mistreatment of
minority shareholders. Id. at §§ 11, 14, 20, 33, 40.
83. See Olson, A Statutory Elixir, supra note 4, at 646-58.
84. This statement is based upon MINN. STAT. § 302A.751 subd. 3a (1984).
85. See Note, Contractual Disclaimer of the Donahue Fiduciary Duty: The Efficacy of the Anti-
Donahue Clause, 26 B.C.L. REv. 1215 (1985).
86. "Reasonable" expectations are those which the majority shareholders know or should know
are held by the noncontrolling participants. Olson, A Statutory Elixir, supra note 4 at 655-56.
87. Id. at 658.
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3. Expressly authorize the shareholders to enter into a shareholder
control agreement.
This provision should remove any doubt as to the validity of a share-
holder control agreement under the Model Act.8" The articles could
contain a statement as follows: "The shareholders are authorized to enter
into a unanimous written agreement to regulate the exercise of the corpo-
rate powers, the management of the business and affairs of the corpora-
tion, and the relations among the shareholders of the corporation."89 The
articles also should require that the agreement be filed with the corpora-
tion and that shares bear a conspicuous legend declaring the existence of
the agreement. 90
4. Elect to dispense with the board of directors by describing who
will perform the duties of the board.
This option, which allows direct shareholder management of the cor-
poration,9 is available to corporations which have 50 or fewer share-
holders.9" This provision, if adopted, will eliminate questions concerning
the validity of shareholder actions which usurp the traditional discretion
of the board of directors. Because the shareholders directly conduct
management, a shareholder voting agreement under section 7.31 of the
Model Act may be used to specify how the business and affairs of the
corporation will be managed.93
88. See supra notes 15-27 and accompanying text.
89. This statement is based upon CLOSE CORP. SUPP., supra note 8, at § 11.
90. "Conspicuous" includes typing in capitals or underlying. MODEL AcT, supra note 3, at
§ 1.40(3). The legend might provide:
The articles and bylaws of this corporation contain many provisions designed to meet the
unique needs of its shareholders, including authorization for any shareholder to cause dis-
solution of the corporation under specified circumstances. The shareholders have entered
into a Shareholder Control Agreement which contains further provisions particular to this
corporation, including restrictions on the transfer of shares of the corporation. All such
documents may be examined by bona fide prospective transferees of shares and other ap-
propriate persons upon written request to the corporate Secretary. All transferees of shares
must become parties to the Shareholder Control Agreement and be bound thereby. No
shares will be transferred on the books of the corporation until the transferee has filed a
consent to be bound, on the form provided by the corporate Secretary, with the
corporation.
91. Compare CLOSE CORP. SuPP., supra note 8, at § t0.
92. MODEL AcT, supra note 3, at § 8.01(c).
93. Little precedent supports direct shareholder management. It holds the potential, however,
for eliminating many of the legal issues which have plagued planning efforts on behalf of minority
shareholders in the past. Compare DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 351.
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5. The number of directors of the corporation should be fixed.
Almost all special control arrangements in a close corporation, such as
cumulative voting or class voting for directors, depend for their efficacy
on the number of directors remaining constant. Because management
decisions are traditionally made at the board level, minority shareholders
must be assured that changes in the number of directors cannot erode
their power and influence.94
6. Provide that the shareholders are entitled to exercise
cumulative voting.
The Model Act is an "opt-in" statute.95 The shareholders do not have
cumulative voting rights unless expressly provided in the articles. Cumu-
lative voting is a device which increases the likelihood, but does not guar-
antee, that a minority shareholder will obtain some representation on the
board. The effectiveness of cumulative voting may be eroded through a
number of techniques. If cumulative voting is provided, further provi-
sions must be included in the articles to deny authority to reduce the
number of directors or stagger the terms of directors96 if sufficient votes
are cast against the amendment to have elected a director under cumula-
tive voting.97 Such provision allows minority shareholders having opera-
tive and effective cumulative voting rights to prevent loss of those rights.
Similar provisions must be included in the articles to deny authority to
amend the articles so as to remove cumulative voting rights.98 Further-
more, shareholders depending on cumulative voting rights must be able
to prevent the corporation from issuing more shares or ensure that they
have an adequate opportunity to retain their proportionate voting
power.9 9
7 Provide for a classified board of directors with class
voting for directors.
This technique for ensuring shareholder representation on the board of
94. The effectiveness of cumulative voting is particularly subject to dilution by changes in the
size of the board of directors. See generally Mills, The Mathematics of Cumulative Voting, 1968
DUKE L.J. 28.
95. MODEL AcT, supra note 3, at § 7.28(b).
96. See id. at § 8.06 (authorizing staggered elections for directors under certain circumstances).
97. See MINN. STAT. § 302A.413 subd. 9 (1984) for an example of this type of limitation.
98. See id.
99. See infra notes 131-40 and accompanying text.
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directors, which the Model Act specifically authorizes," is vastly supe-
rior to cumulative voting because the complicated mathematics of cumu-
lative voting are avoided. When class voting for the board is provided,
cumulative voting should not be provided, because the two mechanisms
are inconsistent.
Class voting offers significant flexibility because the number of shares
in a given class can vary, for example, to reflect differing investments of
the various classes. Class voting also allows a shareholder holding all of
the shares of a given class to engage in simplified estate planning by giv-
ing away shares of the class to his children or other beneficiaries while
retaining a majority of them. Alternatively the shareholder could give
away more shares provided that all of the holders of shares of that class
entered into a shareholders voting agreement which left the original
shareholder in practical control of the votes of the entire class. An ex-
pansion of this concept would be to classify the officers of the corporation
as well and provide that only persons owning shares in a particular class
may hold various offices. Class voting for directors must be protected in
much the same way as cumulative voting. Unless the class agrees, the
corporation should be prevented from amending the articles to eliminate
the class vote, increasing the size of the board of directors, or issuing
more shares of that class.
8. Provide that directors can be removed prior to the expiration of
their term only for cause.
The Model Act specifically authorizes this provision.11 If the articles
provide class voting for directors, however, this limitation may be unnec-
essary. The Model Act allows some protection against unwarranted re-
moval of directors elected by class voting or cumulative voting.'" 2
Additionally, if the directorship is an element of an agreed upon alloca-
tion of control, further protection from removal may be appropriate. On
the other hand, if the shareholders fail to remove a director for cause and
real grounds for removal exist, judicial removal is available under the
Model Act."3
100. MODEL AcT, supra note 3, at § 8.04.
101. Id. at § 8.08(a).
102. Id. at § 8.08(b) & (e).
103. Id. at § 8.09.
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9. Provide that vacancies occurring on the board of directors, for
whatever reason, may be filled only by the shareholders and
that the board cannot act while a vacancy exists except in a
bonafide emergency situation.
The Model Act provides that either shareholders or the board of direc-
tors may fill director vacancies without specifying any priority between
the two groups."° The Model Act further provides that a classified direc-
torship may be filled only by the class of shareholders entitled to elect the
director, if it is filled by the shareholders.10 5 These two subsections, read
together, create a possibility for substantial abuse of shareholder rights.
For example, assume that the board is classified into A, B, and C direc-
tors who are elected respectively by class A, B, and C shares. The C
director dies at 6 a.m. At 10 a.m. the A and B directors meet and pursu-
ant to the statute, elect BW (B's wife) to fill the vacancy.10 6 At 2 p.m.
the widow and executor of C holds a class meeting of the C shareholders
(herself) and elects herself to fill the vacancy. Who is the third director?
If the earlier board action is effective, the C shareholders have no board
position to fill and the class election is inoperative. Such a result is in-
consistent with the purpose of classified directorships. Nevertheless, the
result appears proper under the Model Act.107 Restricting the power to
fill vacancies to the shareholders eliminates the inequitable result de-
scribed in this example.
If the articles require cumulative voting as the technique for insuring a
minority shareholder representation on the board of directors, an alter-
native mechanism must be used. The articles should provide that any
vacancy on the board of directors requires the full board to stand for
election and the board may take no action, other than in bona fide emer-
gencies, prior to the election. Cumulative voting only works when all
directors are standing for election.
104. Id. § 8.10(a).
105. Id. at § 8.10(b).
106. Id. at § 8.10(a)(2).
107. The Official Comment to § 8.10 is silent on this issue.
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10. Provide that any shareholder may call a meeting of shareholders,
that notice of a meeting must be sent to all shareholders whether
or not entitled to vote, that the notice must specify the purpose or
purposes for which the meeting has been called and that no action
may be taken at a shareholders meeting (except for bona fide
emergencies) unless that action has been specified in the notice.
In order for shareholder democracy to work, the shareholder must be
given an adequate opportunity to participate. In a close corporation, the
interests of each shareholder will be significant enough so that any share-
holder should be able to call the shareholders together and place before
them questions concerning their enterprise. The potential for abuse of
this privilege is small and can be alleviated by requiring, for example,
that two shareholders or the holders of 3 percent of the shares join in
calling the meeting.108
11. Provide that any shareholder may bring a proposal before the
shareholders for vote.
With respect to significant issues such as amendment of the articles of
incorporation, merger, share exchange, sale of all the corporate assets, or
dissolution, the Model Act provides that the shareholders are powerless
to consider a proposal unless the board of directors have first approved
it.'1 9 Because the board may always withhold its approval entirely and
not submit the proposal, the board may preclude shareholder action.110
In order to regain their power to control fundamental choices with re-
spect to their corporation, the shareholders must specify a different pro-
cedure in the articles."'
108, Compare MINN. STAT. §§ 302A.135 subd. 2 & 302A.433 subd. 2 (1984). When sharehold-
ers desire to act by unanimous written action, provision must be made for waiver of any notice
requirements.
109, See MODEL ACT, supra note 3, at §§ 10.03(b), 11.03(b), 12.02(b), 14.02(b).
110. This procedure, requiring board approval, is ineffective to block shareholder proposals
which are made under the federal proxy rules in cases involving publicly held corporations. SEC v.
Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 522 (3d Cir. 1947). Compare MINN. STAT. § 302A.135 subd. 2 (1984)
(allowing holders of 3% of the voting power to bring proposals before the shareholders).
11. The shareholders may change the procedure notwithstanding the statement in the Official
Comment to § 10.01 that these rights "must be exercised pursuant to the procedures" of this chap-
ter. MODEL ACT ANNOT., supra note 2, at 1174. Substantive provisions regarding proposals, such
as the vote required for approval, may be modified only as authorized in the statute. See MODEL
ACT, supra note 3, at § 7.27. It is interesting to note that with respect to bylaws (traditionally the
province of the board), shareholders are clearly given the power and authority to amend the bylaws
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12. Provide a high quorum for shareholder action.
The articles may contain provisions increasing the quorum to any ex-
tent desired up to and including unanimity or decreasing the quorum to
zero.1 12 High quorum provisions give minority shareholders an opportu-
nity to veto corporate action by failing to attend a shareholders' meet-
ing.1 13 Furthermore, if a separate provision is included in the articles
reversing the presumptive rule under the Model Act, a shareholder may
leave a meeting, break the quorum, and prevent further action.' 14 A
high quorum requirement can be dangerous, however, because a share-
holder may be under a duty, at least in some instances, to attend share-
holders meetings or waive his right to challenge a quorum." t5
13. Provide that shareholders may take action only by the vote of a
high percentage of the outstanding shares or by unanimous
action.
The Model Act provides that the shareholders may act if the votes cast
favoring the proposition exceed the votes cast opposing it.116  Thus,
abstentions are not counted at all, while at common law they were
deemed negative votes. The effect of this provision is to allow holders of
a very small number of votes to take shareholder action. If a unanimous
vote is not required, the percentage of voting power of the outstanding
shares required for action must be high enough to provide the minority
shareholder or shareholders with veto power. 17  Although the veto
power over all items requiring shareholder action is more appropriate
than similar power at the board level, the scope of the veto may be lim-
ited so long as certain critical actions are included.'
Whenever a high vote requirement is included in the articles, the
to the exclusion of the board. Id. at § 10.20(b). It is incongruous that the shareholders' power with
respect to their investment contract, the articles of incorporation, is not similarly in their hands.
112. MODEL AcT, supra note 3, at §§ 7.25, 7.27.
113. Any veto power increases the likelihood of deadlock. Arbitration or other dispute resolu-
tion devices should be considered in these circumstances. See infra notes 207-08 and accompanying
text.
114. See MODEL AcT, supra note 3, at § 7.25(b). The rule is exactly the opposite for the board
of directors-a quorum must exist at all times before valid action may be taken. Id. at § 8.24(c).
115. Compare Gearing v. Kelly, 11 N.Y.2d 201, 182 N.E.2d 391 (1962) with Hall v. Hall, 506
S.W.2d 42 (Mo. App. 1974).
116. MODEL AcT, supra note 3, at § 7.25(c).
117. See supra note 113.
118. One commentator lists more than a dozen matters which may be subject to veto power
depending on the circumstances affecting the corporation and its shareholders:
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shareholder holding the veto power must be able to prevent the issuance
of more shares of voting stock.'t 9 Furthermore, while the Model Act
authorizes the shareholders, by express provisions in the articles of incor-
poration, to provide that greater quorum or voting requirements for
shareholder action may be specified in the bylaws,120 this option should
not be exercised in the close corporation. 12' As an alternative to a high
vote requirement, the articles may provide for classified shares with class
voting rights with respect to specified transactions. If the corporation
has a classified board and classified shares, this alternative is quite appro-
priate. The transactions which are likely candidates for a class vote are
the same as those for a high vote requirement.' 22
14. Expand dissenters' rights to cover all transactions subject to high
vote or class vote requirements.
The Model Act provides that a shareholder is entitled to dissent from
and obtain payment of the fair value of his shares upon the occurrence of
certain fundamental changes in the corporation or the shareholders' in-
(a) Major organic changes, including an increase in the authorized number of shares,
reductions or capital, recapitalizations, reclassifications, mergers, consolidations, or sales of
assets;
(b) Issuance of additional shares or sales of treasury shares;
(c) Corporate repurchase of outstanding shares;
(d) Creation of new corporate indebtedness;
(e) Reduction in amount of dividends paid on common stock;
(f) Reduction in salaries of officers or major employees;
(g) Involuntary termination of employment officers or major employees;
(h) Reduction in the number of directors constituting the board;
(i) Classification of directors, staggering the terms of directors;
(j) Amendment of the articles of incorporation or by-laws (particularly amendments
which purport to delete high quorum or voting requirements);
(k) Authorization of contracts with corporations, partnerships or other entities in which
any shareholder has a substantial interest;
(1) Dissolution of the corporation;
(in) Filing or consent to a petition in bankruptcy, reorganization or compromise with
creditors.
W. PAINTER, supra note 78, at 41-42.
119. Veto power is not a pure blessing for the shareholder who holds it because it may cause that
shareholder to be "in control" of the corporation for purposes ofjudicial intervention. MODEL AcT,
supra note 3, at § 14.30(2)(ii). See Smith v. Atlantic Properties, Inc., 12 Mass. App. 201, 422 N.E.2d
798 (1981).
120. MODEL ACT, supra note 3, at § 10.21(a).
121. See infra note 125.
122. See supra note 18. Several sections of the Model Act either provide for class voting or
authorize its provision. See MODEL AcT, supra note 3, at §§ 10.04(a), 11.03(f), 12.02(e), 14.02(e).
A high vote requirement within class voting may be desireable when shares of the class are held by
several persons. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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vestment contract. 12 3 These rights may be extended to other transactions
by a provision in the articles, the bylaws, or a board resolution. 24 Vol-
untary extension of dissenters rights may be used in conjunction with
high vote and class vote requirements to encourage a dissatisfied share-
holder to recapture his investment and leave the corporation rather than
prevent the other shareholders from taking action which they believe is
appropriate.
15. Provide that the bylaws of the corporation may only be amended
or repealed by action of the shareholders.
Unless the articles provide that power to change the bylaws resides
exclusively with the shareholders, the bylaws will be within the province
of the board. 125 In a close corporation, the bylaws will often be as impor-
tant a part of the overall control and financial return allocation as the
articles of incorporation. Therefore, the shareholders will want to retain
control over them as well.
16. Provide for nonvoting shares, preferred shares, and other classes
of shares as appropriate.
The Model Act authorizes the creation of innovative classes of shares
without significant limitation.126 Classes of shares may be used to effectu-
ate desired control arrangements among the shareholders as well as to
allocate both current and ultimate financial return among the investors.
The shares may vary in voting rights, redemption or conversion rights,
rights to corporate distributions, and other respects. 127 Minority share-
holders will want to prevent the creation of callable common shares un-
less the call is pursuant to a properly priced buy-sell agreement between
the shareholder and the corporation. 128 Furthermore, the articles should
provide that the corporation may not take any action which would result
in the creation of fractional shares. 129
Stock clauses may, for example, provide for: (1) two classes of shares
123. MODEL Acr, supra note 3, at § 13.02(a)(5).
124. Id.
125. Id. at § 10.20(a).
126. Id. at § 6.01.
127. The Official Comment to § 6.01 gives several examples of classification schemes which may
be used. MODEL AcT ANNOT., supra note 2, at 312.
128. See infra note 162.
129. This eliminates the possibility that a reverse stock split might be used as a device to elimi-
nate the minority shareholders. Compare Teschner v. Chicago Title and Trust Co., 59 II1. 2d 452,
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with equal voting rights but different dividend and liquidation rights;
(2) two classes of shares, one voting and one nonvoting; (3) two classes of
shares with class voting for directors; (4) class voting with classified di-
rectors and classified officers; (5) class voting with a classified board
where one class is held by a financially disinterested party whose function
is to break deadlocks among the shareholders or the other classes;'
30
(6) two classes of shares, one with voting rights and one with preferred
rights to cumulative or mandatory dividends; (7) classes of shares with
class voting rights for specified shareholder action.
1 Z Provide that shares may be issued only upon authorization
of the shareholders.
The Model Act authorizes the board of directors to issue shares for
any consideration, including various promises to pay or perform services
in the future, subject to the limitation that the consideration be "ade-
quate."'' The Model Act does not require that the board determine the
value of consideration and, therefore, the shareholders are relegated
solely to the board's judgment that the sale is "an appropriate transac-
tion" for protection from unfair dilution of their financial interests or
voting power. 132 Because the issuance of additional shares may under-
mine cumulative voting rights or even class voting rights, the sharehold-
ers should determine the circumstances under which additional shares
may be issued. For example, the issuance of additional shares of a class
holding valuable rights is an appropriate occasion for a class vote by
those shareholders.
In conjunction with reserving the right to issue shares to the share-
holders, the articles should not authorize the board of directors to issue
"blank" shares. "Blank" shares are authorized shares which do not have
their terms specified in the articles of incorporation so that the board
may, at its discretion, endow those shares with voting rights, distribution
rights, and other attributes which may derogate the rights of existing
shareholders. 33 Additionally the articles should normally contain a pro-
hibition on the reissuance of acquired shares and a requirement that
322 N.E. 2d 54 (1974) with Clark v. Pattern, Analysis and Recognition Corp., 87 Misc. 2d 385, 384
N.Y.S. 2d 660 (1976).
130. Lehrman v. Cohen, 43 Del. Ch. 222, 222 A.2d 800 (1966).
131. MODEL ACT, supra note 3, at § 6.21(b) & (c).
132. MODEL AcT ANNOT., supra note 2, at 358-59 Official Comment to § 6.21.
133. MODEL ACT, supra note 3, at § 6.02.
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those shares be cancelled. 134 These provisions are especially important if
power to issue shares is left in the hands of the board of directors. The
shareholders should also ensure that the articles prohibit the issuance of
shares of one class as a dividend to shareholders of another class.135
18. Provide that the shareholders have preemptive rights and that
shares may be issued only for cash.
The Model Act takes the opt-in approach to preemptive rights.' 36 If
pre-emptive rights are elected, unless the articles provide otherwise, the
Act provides standard terms for the rights which do not favor the inter-
ests of minority shareholders.' 37 The articles should therefore provide
that shares may not be issued other than for cash. Alternatively, the
articles could extend preemptive rights to every corporate issue or sale of
shares for any form of consideration and for any purpose. 38
Preemptive rights alone do not provide a minority shareholder with
security against dilution of his interest. The shareholder must also be
able and willing to make a further investment in the corporation in order
to protect his position. 39 Some protection is provided to minority share-
holders if the offering price is designed to unfairly dilute the equity of a
nonpurchaser.'4° Preemptive rights do not provide the same degree of
protection to the minority shareholders' proportionate interest in control
and financial return that an outright ban on the issuance of shares pro-
vides. If an outright ban on the issuance of shares without the approval
of a high percentage of shareholders (sufficient to protect the minority
shareholder in question) is provided in the articles, preemptive rights
should not also be provided because the two mechanisms are
inconsistent.
134. Id. at § 6.31(a).
135. See id. at § 6.23(b).
136. Id. at § 6.30(a).
137. Id. at § 6.30(b)(3). The standard model for preemptive rights contained in the statute pro-
vides a one year "window"during which the corporation may sell shares free of unexercised preemp-
tive rights. Id. at § 6.30(b)(6) (the sale must be made for consideration which is not lower than the
offer to shareholders). The one year period will often be too long and it should be shortened by an
appropriate provision in the articles.
138. It may be necessary to authorize stock options and other devices to attract certain employ-
ees. If so, care must be taken to ensure that control arrangements are not undermined by these
transactions. Thus, the shareholders should retain, at least, power to approve any stock option plan.
139. See generally Johnson, Freezing Out Minority Shareholders Through the Issuance of Addi.
tional Shares, 2 MEMPHIS ST. U.L. REV. 375 (1972).
140. See Katzowitz v. Sidler, 24 N.Y.2d 512, 249 N.E.2d 359 (1969).
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19. Restrict the circumstances in which the board may declare
dividends or make other distributions to shareholder.
The Model Act's only limitation on the board's discretion to make
distributions to shareholders is that the corporation, after making the
distribution, must be able to pay its debts as they become due in the
ordinary course of business.'41 This standard allows the board of direc-
tors to make estimates of future cash flow and expenditures in determin-
ing whether the corporation can continue to pay its obligations. The
result is the compounding of business judgment upon business judgment
with respect to forecasts of future events so that the statutory limitation
is, in practice, no limit at all. The minority shareholders will need to
consult carefully with their accountant in order to construct appropriate
limitations on the declaration of dividends and the making of other
shareholder distributions.
20. Provide that the corporation may not mortgage, pledge, or
otherwise encumber any or all of its property otherwise than
in the usual and regular course of business without
shareholder approval.
The Model Act allows the corporation to mortgage or pledge the cor-
poration's assets outside of the ordinary course of business without limi-
tation. 142 Transactions outside the ordinary course of business are so
extraordinary in nature that a requirement of shareholder approval is
appropriate to protect the interests of minority shareholders. Otherwise,
illegitimate distributions to controlling parties are possible through the
medium of a pledge foreclosure by an accommodating outside creditor.
21. Prohibit reduction of directors' standard of care.
The Model Act standard of care for directors follows the traditional
pattern in requiring that a director discharge his duties in good faith,
with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exer-
cise under similar circumstances, and in a manner he reasonably believes
to be in the best interests of the corporation.'43 This is not an onerous
burden and directors should not be allowed to demand provisions in the
141. MODEL AcT, supra note 3, at § 6.40(c)(1).
142. Id. at § 12.01(a)(1).
143. Id. at § 8.30(a).
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articles which exculpate them for failure to live up to this standard.'"
22. Provide that all corporate indemnification is voluntary and all
claims for indemnification receive shareholder approval.
The indemnification provisions of the Model Act are extremely broad.
Directors and officers are entitled to mandatory indemnification while
other employees and agents of the corporation may be indemnified at the
board's discretion.145 An unsuccessful defendant may even petition the
court for indemnification on the basis that he is fairly and reasonably
entitled to it notwithstanding the finding of liability in the original ac-
tion.146 Furthermore, the corporation is authorized to purchase insur-
ance that would provide indemnification in circumstances in which the
corporation itself would not have the necessary power.' 47 Thus, those in
control of the corporation have a substantial opportunity to favor them-
selves at the expense of the other owners of the business. The articles
should, therefore, provide that only disinterested shareholders can ap-
prove claims for voluntary indemnification.
23. Provide expanded grounds for dissolution of the corporation
based on unfair prejudice to the non-controlling
shareholders.
The Model Act continues the traditional grounds for involuntary dis-
solution based upon the "oppressive" conduct of those in control of the
corporation. 148 The articles of incorporation should include a broader
provision providing that the corporation shall be voluntarily dissolved
upon a court's or arbitrator's finding that the directors or those in con-
trol of the corporation have acted in a manner unfairly prejudicial to-
ward one or more shareholders in their capacities as shareholders,
directors, officers, or employees. 149 Because voluntary dissolution is
within the control of the shareholders, 50 a provision in the articles call-
ing for dissolution on the occurrence of a specified event should be valid.
144. See, e.g., DEL. CORP. CODE tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(1986); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(e)(2)
(1985) (willful misconduct or recklessness).
145. MODEL AcT, supra note 3, at §§ 8.52-.56.
146. Id. at § 8.54.
147. Id. at § 8.57.
148. Id. at § 14.30(2)(ii).
149. See MINN. STAT. § 302A.751 subd. l(b)(2) (1984). See generally Olson, A Statutory Elixir,
supra note 4, at 638-42.
150. MODEL AcT, supra note 3, at § 14.02.
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In an alternative, a provision could be inserted in the articles defining the
term "oppressive" as encompassing unfairly prejudicial conduct which
injures a shareholder in any capacity relating to the corporation. The
Model Act contains no definition of the term "oppressive" and the sug-
gested definition is not a significant departure from many of the cases
interpreting statutes based on the Model Act.''
24. Provide that any shareholder may demand voluntary dissolution
of the corporation at will.
This provision is valid under the Close Corporation Supplement.'
52
Its validity under the Model Act, however, is an open question.1 53 Be-
cause voluntary dissolution is within the province of the shareholders,
they should be able to agree in advance that the election of any share-
holder will trigger dissolution. Certainly, a provision in a shareholder
voting agreement requiring all shareholders to vote in favor of dissolu-
tion if any shareholder desires to dissolve the corporation would be
valid.'4 An advance agreement contained in the articles would seem to
stand on the same footing. If dissolution at will is provided, it may be
appropriate to grant the other shareholders of the corporation an option
to buy-out the petitioner at a fair price.1 55
25. Provide that the purposes of the corporation are limited to a
specific line of business.
The corporation has general business purposes unless otherwise pro-
vided in the articles.' 56 A limitation on the purposes of the corporation
will have limited effectiveness because of the narrow scope of the ultra
vires doctrine under the Model Act.157 Such a provision will, neverthe-
less, have a deterrent effect upon the controlling shareholders. Further-
more, the articles may provide remedies for a substantial breach of the
purpose limitation, such as dissolution of the corporation or a provision
for the extension of dissenter's rights to the non-controlling shareholders.
151. See Comment, Involuntary Dissolution of Close Corporation for Mistreatment of Minority
Shareholders, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 1119 (1982).
152. CLOSE CORP. SuPP., supra note 8, at § 15.
153. The Official Comments to § 31 (termination of statutory close corporation status) indicate
that an option to dissolve may not be valid under the Model Act. MODEL ACT Supp. 1847.
154. See infra notes 243-49 and accompanying text.
155. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. AcT. § 1118; infra note 162.
156. MODEL ACT, supra note 3, at § 3.01(a).
157. Id. at § 3.04.
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B. Planning Opportunities Using the Bylaws
The Model Act requires that every corporation have bylaws. 158 Those
bylaws may contain any provision for "managing the business and regu-
lating the affairs of the corporation" which is consistent with the articles
or law. 59 The primary guideline for choosing whether special provisions
will be placed in the articles or the bylaws is whether public notice of the
provision is significant or whether the provision deals merely with inter-
nal governance of the corporation. The Official Comment to section 2.02
of the Model Act contains a list of optional provisions which are valid if
contained in the bylaws. 160 That list may be used as a road map when
considering the planning options open to a minority shareholder. Those
sections of the statute, both presumptive and minimal, that have not been
modified in the articles are candidates for change in the bylaws. Sug-
gested provisions for inclusion in the bylaws are discussed below.
1. Provide for share transfer restrictions.
Share transfer restrictions are a mixed blessing. They do keep outsid-
ers from joining the shareholder group,161 but unless the shareholders
include a buy-sell agreement,1 62 share transfer restrictions also severely
restrict the marketability of the stock in the corporation. If combined
with a buy-sell agreement, however, the total package may eliminate a
major source of dissension among shareholders. The Model Act pro-
vides broad authority for share transfer restrictions serving any reason-
able purpose. 63 The Act requires that the existence of the restriction be
conspicuously noted on the share certificate.164 The Act specifically au-
158. Id. § 2.06(a). Not every statute requires bylaws. See MINN. STAT. § 302A.181 (1984);
CLOSE CORP. SupP., supra note 8, at § 12.
159. MODEL Acr, supra note 3, at § 2.06(b).
160. MODEL AT ANNOT., supra note 2, at §§ 110-111. The list is not exclusive. See supra note
60.
161. This use for transfer restrictions is over-emphasized. The position of minority shareholders,
absent planning such as that discussed in this article, is so weak that minority shares are, as a
practical matter, unsaleable.
162. A buy-sell agreement commits the shareholder or his estate to sell and the corporation or
surviving shareholders to buy stock in the corporation at a price fixed or determined under the
agreement. See generally Kahn, Mandatory Buy-out Agreements for Stock of Closely Held Corpora-
tions, 68 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1969); Lynch, New Look at Buy-Sell Agreements, 30 S. CAL. TAX INST.
775 (1978).
163. MODEL AcT, supra note 3, at § 6.27(c).
164. Id. at § 6.27(b). See id. at § 1.40(3) (defining conspicuous).
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thorizes four types of restrictions which are in common use."' These
restrictions should meet the needs of most close corporations. Careful
drafting of a stock transfer restriction requires consideration of the
following:
(a) whether the restriction applies to transfers between parties to the
restriction,
(b) whether pledges and forms of disposition which do not constitue "sales
or transfers" are covered,
(c) whether certain sales are exempt from the restriction, such as inter-
family gifts and bequests,
(d) whether the restriction, if a right of first refusal or an option to
purchase, requires that all shares held by the offeror be included or that
all shares which are offered be taken up as a block by the holder(s) of
purchase rights (pro rata or otherwise),
(e) whether the shareholder or executor holding the shares in question may
vote (as director or shareholder) with respect to a corporate purchase,
(f) whether installment payments are authorized and security required. 166
2. Provide that all meetings of the board of directors require notice
to directors which specifies the purpose of the meeting and
precludes action beyond those purposes.
Many of the devices discussed in the previous section on planning op-
portunities using the articles attempt to ensure minority shareholder in-
put at the board level. In order that the minority shareholder may make
rational determinations about his attendance at directors' meetings, the
bylaws should require regular directors' meetings, with notice to each
director of the meeting, stating the purposes for which the meeting is to
be held. The bylaws should further limit the board to taking action only
on matters specified in the notice except, of course, in a bona fide emer-
165. MODEL ACT § 6.27(d) provides as follows:
(d) A restriction on the transfer or registration of transfer of shares may:
(1) obligate the shareholder first to offer the corporation or other persons (separately,
consecutively, or simultaneously) an opportunity to acquire the restricted shares;
(2) obligate the corporation or other persons (separately, consecutively, or simultane-
ously) to acquire the restricted shares;
(3) require the corporation, the holders of any class of its shares, or another person to
approve the transfer of the restricted shares, if the requirement is not manifestly
unreasonable;
(4) prohibit the transfer of the restricted shares to designated persons or classes of
persons, if the prohibition is not manifestly unreasonable.
166. See generally Gregory, Stock Transfer Restrictions in Close Corporations, 1978 S. ILL.
U.L.J. 477.
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gency. 167 This provision is especially important if the minority director
is not regularly employed by the corporation at its principal place of
business.
3. Provide for high quorum and high vote requirements
at the board leveL
High quorum requirements are more significant at the board level be-
cause that is where substantial discussion will take place concerning the
operations and management of the business. The quorum is normally a
majority of the fixed number of directorships. However, it can be raised
to unanimity if desired, 16 or reduced to as low as one-third.1 69 Minority
shareholders seeking an effective voice at the director level should never
agree to a lower quorum. 170 If for some reason the shareholders have not
reserved the exclusive power to make the bylaws, they should provide in
any bylaw fixing the vote or quorum for board action that such bylaw
can be amended or repealed only by shareholder action.' 7 1  High vote
requirements are also authorized, including a requirement for unanimity.
Whenever a high vote requirement for board action is part of corpo-
rate planning, appropriate provisions must be placed in the articles to
ensure that the size of the board of directors is not increased thus impair-
ing the veto power granted to the minority director. Furthermore, if the
bylaws require a high vote for director action, the bylaws should not
authorize the board to act by written action concurred in by less than all
directors.172 In addition, if the shareholders feel that face to face director
confrontation is an essential part of the management plan, the bylaws
may deny the board authority to conduct its meetings by conference
call. 173 The impracticalities of such a requirement, however, may weigh
heavily against its use.
167. See MODEL AcT, supra note 3, at § 8.22.
168. Id. at § 8.24(a).
169. Id. at § 8.24(b).
170. Id. at § 8.24(c). A unanimity requirement at the board level may be particularly attractive
to minority shareholders as it will provide, in effect, for management by consensus. See supra note
113.
171. See MODEL Acr, supra note 3, at § 10.22(b).
172. Id. at § 8.21(a) allowed the articles or bylaws to provide for other than unanimous written
consent. See MINN. STAT. § 302A.239 (1984) (authorizing the articles to provide for written action
by mere majority vote).
173. See MODEL AcT, supra note 3, at § 8.20.
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4. Deny the board authority to create special litigation committees
or executive committees or enter into management contracts.
Unless limited, the board of directors may create committees having
some or all of the authority of the board with respect to any or all action
which the board of directors might take. 74 Defendant directors have
designed special litigation committees to terminate derivative actions
brought against them on behalf of the corporation. Such committees al-
most always favor management and recommend that any derivative ac-
tion be dismissed as not in the best interest of the corporation. 75 No
legitimate need for such committee exists in the close corporation
context. 1
76
Unless the minority shareholder is assured of a position on the execu-
tive committee with the same veto power that he has on the board of
directors, the appointment of an executive committee with full powers of
the board can defeat the carefully planned mechanisms which protect the
interests of the minority shareholder. Furthermore, the board of a close
corporation is usually small enough that there is no business necessity for
acting through any group smaller than the full board.
Management contracts are agreements through which the board of di-
rectors delegates substantially all management power to another person
or company. 177 Unless the minority shareholder is the delegate, such
contracts should be prohibited so that board level control devices can
operate effectively.
5. Restrict the board's ability to fix the compensation of directors
and officers.
The Model Act authorizes the board to fix the compensation of direc-
tors' 78 and the compensation of officers.179 Through the innovative use
of compensation techniques such as incentive stock options, directors can
174, Id. at § 8.25(a). The creation of a committee must be approved by a high vote if that is
generally required for director action. See id. at § 8.25(b)(2).
175. See Cox & Musinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal Implica-
tions of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 (1985).
176. See generally Comment (e) to § 7.01(d) of the ALI PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERN-
ANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION COUNSEL DRAFT 5 (1984), which provides special rules
for characterizing a derivative suit as a personal action by the shareholder when a closely-held cor-
poration is involved.
177. Pohn v. Diversified Indus., Inc., 403 F. Supp. 413 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
178. MODEL ACT, supra note 3, at § 8.11.
179. Id. at § 8.40(a).
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alter the balance of power in the corporation.18 Shareholders should
always retain control over payment of compensation in forms other than
cash. If all of the shareholders are employees of the corporation, the
bylaws may deny compensation for the performance of directorial duties
and provide that officers' compensation will be equal or in fixed
proportions.
6. Restrict the board's authority to have the corporation make loans
or incur obligations with regard to matters outside the usual
and regular course of business.
The bylaws may absolutely deny the board authority to engage in these
transactions or the bylaws may only authorize transactions below a set
dollar amount. Transactions within the prohibition may be authorized
by a high vote of the board of directors if that device will give the minor-
ity shareholder veto power. In the alternative, the bylaws may require
shareholder approval for these extraordinary transactions. Similar re-
strictions should be placed on the board's authority to have the corpora-
tion mortgage or pledge its assets in transactions not in the usual and
regular course of the corporation's business.18
Z Prescribe qualifications for directors.
The authority' 82 to prescribe qualifications for directors is exercised
very infrequently. In a close corporation, the bylaws could require that
directors be shareholders or, if the enterprise is a family business, that
they be members of the family. If the corporation intends to act as a
contractor for the United States Department of Defense, directors may
be required to be U.S. citizens, hold appropriate security clearances, or
meet other special requirements.18 3
8. Require that the corporation have certain officers and that
particular officers be holders of a specified class of shares.
Such a requirement allows minority shareholders to have control over
180. If expanded preemptive rights have been granted to the shareholders, this method of dilut-
ing minority shareholder interest will not work. See supra notes 136-90 and accompanying text.
181. See MODEL AcT, supra note 3, at § 12.01(a)(2).
182. Id. at § 8.02.
183. See Finkelstein, Stock Transfer Restrictions on Alien Ownership under Section 202 of the
Delaware General Corporation Law, 38 Bus. LAW. 573 (1983).
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certain aspects of the corporation's operations. 184 It operates in a man-
ner similar to classified directorships provided in the articles.
9. Define the officers' powers and duties, terms of office,
circumstances of removal and limit the authority to
delegate power.
If the bylaws fix the authority and duties of certain corporate officers
and the minority shareholder is assured of holding a particular office, the
shareholder may acquire substantial control over day-to-day opera-
tions. 85 The bylaws should, of course, further protect the shareholder
from removal by the directors without cause.' 86 Additional limitations
may be provided in the bylaws, such as: requiring several corporate of-
ficers, including the shareholder who wants veto power, to execute
checks, notes and substantial contracts; or limiting the authority of cor-
porate officers with respect to usual and regular course of business trans-
actions by providing low dollar limitations unless another officer (the
shareholder) or the board (if a high vote is required for action) approves
the transactions.187 The bylaws can also require special approval before
the corporation can employ "highly compensated" persons.1 88
10. Provide that any shareholder may call a special meeting
of the shareholders.
If significant power has been lodged in the shareholders, any share-
holder should be able to call the shareholders together to consider
whether action should be taken.' 89 In the absence of such a provision, a
shareholder or shareholders will need to hold 10 percent of the voting
power in order to demand a meeting.' 90 The bylaws should further pro-
184. MODEL ACT, supra note 3, at § 8.40(a).
185. Id. at § 8.41.
186. Id. at § 8.43. In the alternative, the officer may be given contract rights to employment for
a specified term. Such contract rights will not prevent removal from office, however, the former
officers will be entitled to damages for breach of contract. See id. at § 8.44. A fair price buy-out of
the former officer's shares is appropriate. See supra note 162.
187. See O'Neal, Close Corporation Control Agreements, BENCH AND BAR OF MINN. 19, 23
(Sept. 1973).
188. It will be necessary to define "highly compensated" in the bylaws. The definition could, for
example, refer to a specific dollar amount or determine highly compensated status by reference to the
salaries of current personnel (average salary of vice presidents or some similar formula).
189. See MODEL ACT, supra note 3, at § 7.02(a)(1). See also supra note 11, (granting sharehold-
ers power to propose matters for shareholder vote).
190. Id. at § 7.02(a)(2).
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vide that if the meeting is adjourned a new notice must be sent to all
shareholders before another meeting can be held, unless all the share-
holders were present at the adjourned meeting. 191 An adjourned meeting
is an unusual occurrence and a shareholder who may have been willing
to miss the original meeting may well desire to attend any continuation
of that shareholders meeting. The usual rule for shareholder meetings is
that shareholders may leave the meeting, thus destroying the presence of
a quorum and preventing further action.' 92 The Model Act's rule for
directors is the opposite193 and consideration should be given to specify-
ing a rule in the bylaws governing the corporation's shareholders
meetings.
11. Require shareholder approval for loans to directors, transactions
involving director conflict of interest, and claims for
indemnification.
These transactions should be subject to shareholder approval because
they are likely to be of questionable benefit to the corporation, and the
director's judgment is likely to be clouded. Such transactions are isolated
events of an extraordinary nature with respect to which a requirement of
shareholder approval will not cause inconvenience. Only disinterested
shareholders should be counted for a quorum or allowed to vote with
regard to these transactions. 194 Counsel may wish to consider whether
the Model Act's definition of a conflict of interest transaction 95 is suffi-
ciently broad with respect to the activities of the corporation in question.
Furthermore, extension of these restrictions to transactions involving
non-director officers of the corporation will often be appropriate.
12. Expand dissenter's rights to cover all shares whether or not entitled
to vote and include more corporate activities.
Even when major changes in the fundamental structure of the corpora-
tion are undertaken, the Model Act restricts dissenter's rights to share-
holders who are entitled to vote on the matter. 96 If the shareholders
investment takes the form of a minority holding of voting shares com-
191. See id. at § 7.05(e).
192. Levisa Oil Corp. v. Quigley, 217 Va. 898, 234 S.E.2d 257 (1977).
193. See MODEL AcT, supra note 3, at § 8.24.
194. See id. at §§ 8.31, 8.32, 8.55.
195. Id. at § 8.31.
196. Id. at § 13.02(a).
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bined with nonvoting preferred shares, a fundamental change may sub-
stantially impair the shareholder's investment, unless he is entitled to
dissent and receive fair value for all of his shares. The Model Act further
restricts dissenters' rights to instances where an amendment to the arti-
cles "materially and adversely" affects certain rights of that share-
holder.197 The bylaws, however, may extend dissenters' rights to all
shareholders and to any corporate action, provided a shareholder vote is
required for approval of that action. 198
13. Provide that all shareholders have an absolute right to examine
the corporation's books and records at any time and to
receive free copies of those records.
The Model Act places substantial limitations on the ability of share-
holders to inspect and copy corporate records.199 In nonpublic corpora-
tions, shareholder access to information about the corporation depends
on the shareholder's right of inspection. Few legitimate reasons exist for
limiting shareholder access to books and records in the close corporation
context. Shareholders will have significant investment in the business,
substantial interest in its management and control, and powers which are
best exercised in the light of full and complete information. It may be
desireable to put limited practical restrictions on access, such as, exami-
nation during normal business hours and a cost-based fee after some free
copying allowance has been used. While providing an absolute right of
access, the bylaws may restrict the shareholder's ability to use that infor-
mation in a manner which is likely to injure the corporation.2"
The bylaws may also specify the type of financial information which
the corporation is required to provide to its shareholders.2"' The Model
Act does not require the corporation to keep its financial records in ac-
cordance with generally accepted accounting practices. Only "appropri-
ate" records are required.20 2 Venture capitalists and other astute
investors always insist on proper accounting records and minority share-
holders should do the same.
197. Id. at § 13.02(a)(4).
198. Id. at § 13.02(a)(5). See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text. There is no apparent
reason for the Model Act's restriction on the voluntary extension of dissenter's rights to corporate
actions only when taken pursuant to a shareholder vote.
199. See MODEL ACT, supra note 3, at § 16.02.
200. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 302A.461 subds. 4a and 4b (1985).
201. See MODEL ACT, supra note 3, at § 16.01(b).
202. Id. at § 16.01(b).
Number 2]
Washington University Open Scholarship
544 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
14. Define significant terms such as "'substantially all" and
"oppressive" as they apply to this corporation.
Many key terms used in the Model Act are not defined. These terms
may be defined in the articles203 or in the bylaws.
15. Provide a procedure for exercising cumulative voting rights.
Unless the bylaws provide a different procedure, the board of directors
can prevent a shareholder from exercising cumulative voting rights by
failing to conspicuously state in the meeting notice that cumulative vot-
ing is authorized. 2" In addition, if no shareholder gives forty-eight
hours notice of his intention to vote cumulatively, the shareholders can-
not do so.205 If cumulative voting is the chosen device for ensuring a
shareholder's voice at the board of director level, steps must be taken to
guarantee that the shareholder can vote effectively.2 °6
16. Provide for arbitration or other nonjudicial dispute resolution.
No dispute, other than certain divorce actions, brings out the strong
emotions that occur in a fullblown dispute among participants in a close
corporation. The shareholders will frequently want to avoid the public-
ity of a public trial and secure the expertise of chosen arbitrators, to reap
the benefits of speed and reduced cost available in arbitration. Arbitra-
tion may be elected in the bylaws by including a simple one paragraph
statement provided by the American Arbitration Association. 2 7 Alter-
natively, counsel may choose a more detailed arbitration provision
designed to ensure that arbitrators will deal effectively with all matters
involving the corporation and its shareholders.20 8
203. See supra note 151.
204. MODEL ACT, supra note 3, at § 7.28(d)(1).
205. Id. at § 7.28(d)(2).
206. See MINN. STAT. § 302A.215 subd. 1 (1984) (requires no statement regarding cumulative
voting in the notice and allowing a shareholder to cumulate votes so long as notice is given to any
officer of the corporation before the meeting or to the presiding officer at the meeting at any time
before the election).
207. The American Arbitration Association's standard arbitration clause provides:
Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract, or the breach thereof,
shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the
American Arbitration Association, and judgment upon the award rendered by the Arbitra-
tor(s) may be entered in any Court having jurisdiction thereof.
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES 2 (1982).
208. OLSON & SPENCER, SHAREHOLDER PLANNING 204-05 (Minnesota CLE 1984).
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IV. PLANNING OPPORTUNITIES USING SHAREHOLDERS'
AGREEMENTS
Shareholder" 9 agreements210 in the close corporation context may be
divided into two types: the shareholder voting agreement and the share-
holder control agreement. 2 1' The shareholder voting agreement operates
only at the shareholder level through the traditional shareholder preroga-
tive of voting for directors and upon fundamental changes to the corpo-
rate structure. Shareholder control agreements, on the other hand,
operate at the board of directors or corporation level by directly affecting
the management of the business and affairs of the corporation. The dis-
tinction between the two types of agreements is not always clear in the
case law 212 nor in corporation statutes. 2 13
The Official Comment to the 1969 Model Act's version of what is now
section 7.31 described a voting agreement as one which is "devised pri-
marily as a means of effecting a specific allocation of representation on
the Board of Directors. 21 4 The Official Comment to section 7.31 states
that mere voting agreements are "universally upheld" while "more re-
cent cases have relaxed the strict rule that all shareholder agreements
209. The holder of a convertible debenture may be considered an "inchoate shareholder" for
purposes of validating, as a shareholder' agreement, a debenture indenture which contains a survival
clause. Westland Capital Corp. v. Lucht Eng'g., Inc., 308 N.W.2d 709 (Minn. 1981). The Minne-
sota Act was amended in 1982 to exclude agreements including, as parties, persons who are not at
the time they enter the agreement actual "shareholders" by adding the word "solely"to the share-
holder agreement provisions. MINN. STAT. §§ 302A.455; 302A.457, subds. I and 2 (1984). Thus a
debenture holder, such as those in Westland Capital, will not be able to claim the security of the safe
harbor provided in the act. This is a trap for the unwary, however, because any debenture holder
with sufficient bargaining power to cause the corporation to enter into a restrictive debtenture agree-
ment containing a survival clause will have sufficient power to demand one share of stock (non-
voting and callable if no conversion occurs) in addition to the debenture. Furthermore, Westland
Capital continues as good law because the statutory safe harbors are nonexclusive. See MINN. STAT.
§ 302A.457 subd. 4 (1984). The Model Act, sensibly, does not attempt to alter the bargaining power
between the corporation and investors in this fashion.
210. While the agreement should always be in a signed writing, oral agreements are enforceable.
Wasserman v. Rosengarden, 405 N.E.2d 131 (Il. App. 1980).
211. The Minnesota Business Corporation Act is the only statute to explicitly distinguish be-
tween these two types of agreements. If the agreement is operative only at the shareholder level, the
agreement need not be unanimous and it is called a "shareholder voting agreement". MINN. STAT.
§ 302A.455 (1984). An agreement which is operative on any other level in the corporate structure,
usually the board of directors level, must be unanimous, filed with the corporation, and noted on the
share certificates and is referred to as a "shareholder control agreement." Id. at § 302A.457.
212. See, e.g., Hart v. Bell, 222 Minn. 69, 23 N.W.2d 375 (1946).
213. Compare MODEL ACr, supra note 3, at § 7.31 with CLOSE CORP. SUPP., supra note 8, at
§ 20.
214. MODEL AcT ANNOT., supra note 2, at 732.
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restricting the discretion of directors are invalid. ' 21- The case law vali-
dates agreements that one or more shareholders enter into which name
the persons who will be the corporation's directors.216 In addition, the
courts validate agreements among all or almost all shareholders which
name the persons who will be the corporation's officers, specify the sala-
ries to be paid to those officers, or specify a policy governing distributions
to shareholders.217
A. Shareholder Voting Agreements
The Model Act provides specific authority for written "voting agree-
ments' 218 in which two or more shareholders specify the manner in
which they will vote their shares.219 The Model Act provision is a "safe
harbor" providing nonexclusive statutory validation of shareholder con-
tracts, and does not apply to, limit or restrict agreements otherwise valid
under the common law of corporations. 220 The voting agreement can
directly affect the parties to it only in their capacity as shareholders. It is
a non-unanimous agreement among shareholders which is operative only
at the shareholder level through the mechanism of voting shares. Such
an agreement, therefore, is subject to the "corporate norm" and may not
usurp the prerogatives of the board. The agreement may control who is
elected to the board, but it cannot control what that person does as a
director with respect to his duties owed to all shareholders. The agree-
ment may, however, cover other matters for which shareholder voting is
required, such as amendments to the articles or bylaws, or fundamental
changes in the corporation.22'
215. Id. at 713. See also supra notes 15-27 and accompanying text. See generally Morganstern,
Agreements for Small Corporation Control, 17 CLEVE.-MAR. L. REV. 324 (1968); Comment, Share.
holder Pooling Agreements, 24 ARK. L. REV. 501 (1971).
216. See, e.g., Ringling Bros-Barnum and Bailey Combined Shows v. Ringling, 29 Del. Ch. 610,
53 A.2d 441 (1947).
217. See, eg., Glazer v. Glazer, 374 F.2d 390 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 831 (1967); Galler
v. Galler, 32 Ill.2d 16, 203 N.E.2d 577 (1965); Westland Capital Corp. v. Lucht Eng'g, Inc., 308
N.W.2d 709 (Minn. 1981); Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641 (1936). See also Bulloch,
Shareholder Agreements in Closely-Held Corporations Is Sterilization an Issue?, 59 TEMPLE L.Q. 61,
82 (1986).
218. Voting agreements are often referred to as "pooling agreements" in the literature.
219. MODEL ACT, supra note 3, at § 7.31(a). The agreement is binding on those shareholders
who have signed it.
220. See supra notes 216-17. Compare CLOSE CORP. SuPP., supra note 8, at § 20(h) with MINN,
STAT. § 302A.457 subd. 4 (1984).
221. Examples of such changes include mergers, share exchanges, sales of all or substantially all
assets, or dissolution of the corporation.
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The shareholder voting agreement must be contained in a signed writ-
ing. Although the Model Act places no durational limits on shareholder
agreements, the writing itself should provide a specific time limit to pre-
clude judicial imposition of a limitation, such as, a reasonable time. A
number of alternatives are available for the duration provision. A clause
could be inserted which would provide, in the alternative: the agreement
continues so long as any two parties, or original parties, own stock in the
corporation; the agreement continues so long as the aggregate voting
power of the shares the parties, or original parties, own exceeds a speci-
fied percentage; or the agreement continues until vote of a specified
number of shares or number of parties terminate it. The agreement
could also provide that the entire agreement, or certain portions of it,
terminate upon the public offering of the corporation's shares.222 Stock
transfer restrictions will be necessary to ensure that the transfer of shares
to persons who are not bound by the agreement does not render the
agreement ineffective. Because a shareholder voting agreement depends
for its effectiveness upon the percentage of outstanding shares held by the
parties to it, transfer of shares subject to the agreement must be restricted
to transferees who consent to the agreement. 223
A shareholder voting agreement is not subject to the limitations placed
on voting trusts. 224  A voting trust is an alternative mechanism for
achieving the results of a shareholder voting agreement.225 The voting
trust is limited to a ten year duration226 and can be cumbersome to draft
and implement. 227 The voting trust, however, has the advantage of being
self-effectuating.
A shareholder voting agreement, under the Model Act, may be specifi-
222. Shareholders' agreements in close corporations almost always contain provisions which are
not appropriate once the corporation becomes publicly held. The same will often be true of the
corporation's articles and bylaws. See supra Part III.
223. The issuance of the new share certificate and the transfer of shares on the books of the
corporation should be conditioned on delivery to the other parties to the agreement, or the corporate
secretary, of a written consent to become a party to the agreement and be bound thereby. An appro-
priate legend should be placed on each share certificate held by the party to the voting agreement.
See supra note 90.
224. MODEL ACT, supra note 3, at § 7.31(a).
225. See generally Woloszyn, A Practical Guide to Voting Trusts, 4 U. BALT. L. REV. 245 (1975);
Note, Close Corporations: Voting Trust Legislation and Resolution of Deadlocks, 67 COLUM. L. REV.
590 (1967).
226. MODEL AcT, supra note 3, at § 7.30(b).
227. See generally Note, The Voting Trust: Drafting Suggestions, 42 N.Y.U.L. REV. 349 (1967).
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cally enforced.22 Specific performance, though, may not always be the
most desirable remedy. For example, in the Ringling Bros. -Barnum and
Bailey Combined Shows v. Ringling,229 the plaintiff was better off with the
court's refusal to count the votes cast in violation of the contract than she
would have been had specific performance been decreed.230 As an alter-
native to specific performance, the agreement may provide for voiding
the votes cast in violation of the agreement. Even so, if a breach cannot
be adequately remedied through money damages, injunction or specific
performance, an enforcement mechanism should be built into the agree-
ment to ensure the desired result.231
The mechanism most commonly used is the irrevocable appointment
of a person as the shareholder's proxy to vote the shares in accordance
with the agreement. The appointment of a proxy must be contained in a
written instrument which is filed with the secretary or other agent of the
corporation at or before the shareholder action for which it is to be effec-
tive.232 The appointment is valid for a period of eleven months unless the
appointment expressly provides for a longer or shorter period.233 All
appointments are revocable at will in accordance with the consensual na-
ture of the agency relationship.234 If the proxy is not acting exclusively
for the benefit of the shareholder, the nature of the relationship takes on
a more complex aspect as it is no longer merely a single-party consensual
grant of authority. In such instances, the appointment may be
irrevocable.
In order to make an appointment irrevocable, the written instrument
must conspicuously state that the appointment is "irrevocable" and the
appointment must be "coupled with an interest. ' 235 The "coupled with
an interest" standard for irrevocability is generally defined by case
228. MODEL AcT, supra note 3, at § 7.31(b).
229. 29 Del. Ch. 610, 53 A.2d 441 (1947).
230. See W. PAINTER, supra note 78, at 29-30.
231. The Official Comment to § 7.31 invites the draftsman to provide his own enforcement
mechanism in addition to or in lieu of specific performance. MODEL ACT ANNOT., supra note 2, at
705.
232. MODEL ACT, supra note 3, at § 7.22(b) & (c).
233. The text of the Model Act provides only for specifying a "longer" period. MODEL ACT,
supra note 3, at § 7.22(c). An appointment which expires by its own terms prior to the passage of 11
months should, nevertheless, be given effect in accordance with that term of the appointment. See
MODEL AcT ANNOT., supra note 2, at 603, Official Comment to § 7.22.
234. MODEL AcT, supra note 3, at § 7.22(d).
235. Id.
[Vol. 64:507
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol64/iss2/6
Number 2] REPRESENTING MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS
law,236 although the Model Act specifies five situations in which the ap-
pointment is deemed coupled with an interest.2 37 In situations which do
not fall within those specified in the Model Act, irrevocability may be
uncertain. 23
8
The shareholder voting agreement provides complete flexibility to
achieve the shareholders' goals so long as they can be effectuated by the
voting of shares. The parties may agree to vote their shares in accord-
ance with two basic provisions used singly or in conjunction: specific
results may be required, or a method of determining how the covered
shares will be voted may be provided. Such methods include voting in
accordance with the instructions of a third party, voting as the holders of
a majority of the covered shares decide, or voting as specified persons
direct with respect to specified issues. Flexibility is further provided be-
cause the voting agreement may bind the parties for some purposes but
not for others. Within the scope of authority accorded shareholder vot-
ing agreements, the only limitation is that the agreement cannot be used
to defraud, oppress or wrong third parties.2 39  A shareholder voting
agreement may contain provisions regarding the following matters.
236. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 138 (1958).
237. Appointments deemed coupled with an interest include the appointment of:
(1) a pledgee; (2) a person who purchased or agreed to purchase the shares; (3) a creditor
of the corporation who extended it credit under terms requiring the appointment; (4) an
employee of the corporation whose employment contract requires the appointment; or
(5) a party to a voting agreement created under section 7.31.
MODEL ACT, supra note 3, at § 7.22(d).
238. Traditionally, the "coupled with an interest" standard is applied very restrictively to in-
clude only property interests in the shares the appointment covers. The trend, however, is to sustain
the appointment against an attempt to revoke "if it is supported by consideration moving from the
proxy holder to the maker, if the proxy holder has changed his position in reliance on the proxy, or if
the proxy was given to further or to protect the interests of the proxy holder." F. O'NEAL, supra
note 6, § 5.36. Compare DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW, § 212(c) ("in the shares or in the corporation");
MINN. STAT. § 302A.449 subd. 2 (1984) (same). It is unfortunate that the Model Act continues to
base this important determination on an anachronistic analogy to agency law. See Calumet Indus.,
Inc. v. MacClure, 464 F. Supp. 19 (N.D IIl. 1978) (applying a restrictive view of "coupled with an
interest" to require that the interest be security for a loan, title to the shares themselves, or an
employee's interest with respect to the corporation.). See generally Note, The Irrevocably Proxy and
Voting Control of Small Business Corporations, 98 U. PA. L. REV. 401 (1950); Comment Irrevocable
Proxies, 43 TEx. L. REV. 733, 738-47 (1965).
239. Wilson v. McClenny, 262 N.C. 121, 128, 136 S.E.2d 569, 575 (1964); Hart v. Bell, 222
Minn. 69, 79, 23 N.W.2d 375, 380-81 (1946); E. FOLK, THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION
LAW; A COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS 518 (1972).
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1. Specified persons will be elected to the board of directors.
The persons specified could include the parties to the agreement or
outsiders who can act as the "swing" director should there be disagree-
ment among the shareholder-directors of the corporation. Whenever
specific individuals are named for election to the board, provision must
be made for selecting successors. If the corporation has not provided a
buy-out for the shares of a deceased shareholder, those who succeed to
those shares under the shareholder's will should be authorized to name
the successor. When predetermined financial goals are not met by the
corporation, it may be desirable to provide that a particular shareholder
or group of shareholders may specify the persons who shall immediately
be elected to the board (by removing the present board if necessary).
2. Incorporate by reference the existing articles and bylaws and
provide that no amendments will be adopted except as
provided in the agreement.
If the existing articles and bylaws are made a part of the agreement,
the parties to the agreement will have contract rights to enforce those
provisions. This is especially important as a "backstop" against efforts
by those in control of the corporation to evade protections which the
non-controlling shareholders have built into the articles or bylaws, such
as those suggested earlier in this Article. Any provision which is impor-
tant to the minority shareholders should be incorporated by reference.
The shareholders' agreement should then provide that it can only be
amended by mutual agreement or a high vote of the parties to it. In
addition, it should provide that no party to the agreement may vote his
shares in favor of an amendment to the articles or bylaws unless the par-
ties to the agreement have approved the casting of that vote in the same
manner as an amendment to the agreement. Provisions in the statute
which are of particular importance to the minority shareholder should, if
not already repeated in the articles or bylaws, be placed in the share-
holder voting agreement. This will prevent legislative changes to the
statute from undercutting the carefully planned "deal" the shareholders
have negotiated.2 40
240. Compare MINN. STAT. § 301.37 subd. 3(2) (1980) (two-thirds vote required) with MINN.
STAT. § 302A.135 subd. 4 (1984) (majority vote). On January 1, 1984, all existing Minnesota corpo-
rations became governed by chapter 302A and the earlier corporation law, in view of which those
corporations were incorporated, was repealed. With one limited exception, shareholders of those
corporations automatically lost the right to block corporate action by the negative vote of one-third
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3. Provide that certain amendments will be made to the articles
or bylaws.
When the shareholder voting agreement is negotiated after the corpo-
ration has been formed, it will frequently be necessary, as part of the
overall "deal", to amend the articles or bylaws to include protective pro-
visions. The shareholder voting agreement, however, is often signed
prior to carrying out those changes. In that event, the shareholders
should be committed to vote in favor of those changes and they should be
set out in full in the agreement.24' It will also be necessary to cancel the
power which the board of directors is given under the Model Act to
block shareholder action regarding amendments to the articles and vari-
ous fundamental changes in the corporate structure.24 2
4. Provide that no votes will be cast with respect to organic changes
in the corporate structure, except as provided in the
agreement.
The mechanisms provided in the shareholder voting agreement should
control shareholder initiation or approval of organic changes to the cor-
poration such as merger, exchange of shares, or sale of all or substan-
tially all assets. Whatever the power the shareholder is given by virtue of
the provisions contained in the voting agreement to determine how cov-
ered shares will be voted should be brought to bear on these extraordi-
nary matters since they contain strong potential for treating the
shareholder contrary to his expectations.
5. Provide that shares will be voted for dissolution of the corporation
as provided iii the agreement.
The agreement could provide that upon the occurrence of specified
events the parties will vote their shares in favor of dissolution.243 Exam-
ples of such events would include modifications of the Model Act's provi-
of the shareholders. In order to prevent the possibility of this kind of legislative repeal of provisions
on which the minority shareholders are depending, those provisions must be included in one of the
corporate governance documents drafted for the corporation in question.
241. See Beresovski v. Warszawski, 28 N.Y.2d 419, 322 N.Y.S.2d 673, 271 N.E.2d 520 (1971).
242. See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
243. MODEL AcT, supra note 3, at § 14.02 provides that a majority of shareholders may approve
dissolution of the corporation. In order, however, for the shareholders to have this power they must
include in the articles a provision cancelling the board's authority to block the shareholder vote. See
supra note 241.
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sions calling for judicial dissolution. 244 The shareholders' voting
agreement could provide that all covered shares will be voted in favor of
dissolution of the corporation upon a determination (for example, by a
court or an arbitrator) that those in control of the corporation have ac-
ted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal, oppressive, fraudu-
lent, unfair or prejudicial to any party to the agreement whether in his
capacity as shareholder, director, officer, or employee of the corpora-
tion.24 5 Additionally, the agreement could provide that if the directors
are deadlocked in the management of corporate affairs for a period ex-
ceeding, for example, three months with respect to any material item, all
covered shares will be voted for dissolution.246 The shareholder voting
agreement may also provide that the shares the agreement covers will be
voted in favor of dissolution on the nonoccurrence of a specified event,
such as, failure to pay dividends equal to a set percentage of net earnings
for at least three of the past four years. 247 Alternatively, the covered
shares could be voted in favor of dissolution upon the request of a speci-
fied percentage of the parties (per capita or by share holdings). The effect
of such a provision could be to give a shareholder the option to dissolve
the corporation at will without the uncertainty which surrounds a direct
grant of that privilege.248 If a dissolution provision is placed in a share-
holder voting agreement, it may be appropriate to give the shareholders
who do not favor dissolution an optional right to buy-out at a fair price
244. See MODEL ACT, supra note 3, at § 14.30(1).
245. Compare Close Corp. Supp., supra note 8, at § 40(a)(l).
246. This provision does not require further proof that the shareholders are unable to break the
deadlock (often unlikely in a close corporation because the shareholders and directors will be the
same persons), nor does it require a further showing either that irreparable injury is being threatened
to or suffered by the corporation or that the business and affairs of the corporation can no longer be
conducted to the advantage of the shareholders generally. Compare MODEL ACT, supra note 3, at §
14.30(2)(i). Therefore, profitability of the corporation would not be a bar to dissolution. See MINN.
STAT. § 302A.751 subd. 3 (1984); CLOSE CORP. Supp., supra note 8, at § 43(a).
247. If minority shareholders are inactive and dependent for their financial return on dividends
while the majority are active in the business and receive their return in the form of salaries, an
economic conflict of interest exists. In this circumstance the minority would be well advised to
demand the payment of dividends and enforce that demand through a provision such as that sug-
gested here. A dividend requirement, of course, implicates management control of the corporation
and like other provisions limiting the board's management discretion is the subject of a shareholder
control agreement. See infra Part IV(B)(4). Because of the uncertainty surrounding direct enforce-
ment of such control agreements, see infra notes 255-59 and accompanying text, indirect enforce-
ment-through deterrence-by means of a dissolution provision in the shareholders' voting
agreement is desirable to make the protections afforded the minority shareholders truly effective.
248. See supra note 153.
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those who do.249
6. Include optional provisions involving other matters arising
between the parties.
If a buy-sell agreement does not appear in the bylaws, it is an appropri-
ate candidate for inclusion in a shareholder voting agreement.250
7. Include an arbitration clause regarding disputes which arise
under the agreement.
Disputes between the shareholders are as likely to occur over the
meaning and implementation of a shareholder voting agreement as any
other corporate governance document. Thus, the agreement should pro-
vide for arbitration and grant the arbitrator an irrevocable proxy from
each party to vote that party's shares in accordance with the arbitrator's
decision.251
8. Include in the agreement a severability provision, a cure provision,
and a survival provision.
The agreement should contain a severability provision, providing that
the invalidity of one provision of the agreement does not render the re-
maining provisions inoperative.252 In using such a provision, counsel
should give careful consideration to the relative importance of the vari-
ous pieces of the parties' "deal." Portions of the shareholders' deal may
be so significant that a finding of invalidity with respect to that provision
should cancel all agreements and terminate the endeavor. If this is the
case, the severability, provision will have to be limited and the agreement
should expressly provide for the dissolution of the corporation. The
shareholder voting agreement should also contain a cure provision pro-
viding that the parties will take or cause to be taken all necessary acts to
render the agreement valid and enforceable.253 If the agreement is exe-
249. See supra note 155.
250. See generally supra note 162 and accompanying text.
251. In Ringling Bros., the Delaware Supreme Court refused to allow this enforcement mecha-
nism. The Model Act is more generous in this regard. See MODEL AcT, supra note 3, at § 7.31(b);
MODEL AcT ANNOT., supra note 2, at 705, Official Comment to § 7.21. See also supra notes and
accompanying text.
252. See Beresovski v. Warszawski, 28 N.Y.2d 419, 322 N.Y.S.2d 673, 271 N.E.2d 520 (1971).
253. See Zion v. Kurtz, 50 N.Y.2d 92, 428 N.Y.S.2d 199, 405 N.E.2d 681 (1980). In Zion the
shareholders' agreement contained a provision which, under the applicable law, was enforceable only
if contained in the articles of incorporation. The parties to the agreement had the power to amend
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cuted as a preincorporation agreement or if the agreement is part of an-
other document such as a loan agreement involving convertible
securities, provision must be made for the agreement to survive the par-
ties' transition to actual shareholder status. Thus, the agreement should
provide that its provisions, or specified provisions, survive the incorpora-
tion or repayment of the loan so long as the parties have actually become
shareholders of the corporation as the agreement contemplates.
254
B. Shareholder Control Agreements
Control agreements are formed on the shareholder level but are in-
tended to operate on other levels in the corporate structure. They fre-
quently specify corporate policies and name corporate personnel
performing functions reserved for the board of directors in the prototypi-
cal corporation. Control agreements are essential because shareholder
voting agreements merely specify who will be directors and do not specify
how the board will exercise its powers.
The Model Act does not specifically authorize shareholder control
agreements, 255 although most modem statutes provide for them.256 Nev-
ertheless, it is possible under the Model Act to specifically authorize such
a shareholders' agreement by including an appropriate provision in the
articles of incorporation.257 Furthermore, the common law of corpora-
tions authorizes control agreements where they are entered into by all (or
all but an inconsequential, unharmed and uncomplaining group) of the
shareholders, and do not adversely affect creditors, do not contravene the
statutory "skeleton," and do not impair provisions directed to the
courts.258 This rule is simply another way of stating the normal rule
the articles and they had agreed to take all necessary acts, although no amendment was ever
adopted. Following the maxim of equity that what ought to have been done is deemed to have been
done, the court reformed the articles to include the necessary provisions, which were thus valid, and
enforced them. In Adler v. Svingos, 436 N.Y.S.2d 719 (App. Div. 1981), the court adopted the Zion
rationale and enforced a provision contained in the shareholders' agreement but not in the articles of
incorporation, where the parties to the agreement had the power to amend the articles although they
had not expressly agreed that they would take all action necessary to make the agreement valid and
enforceable. But see Gazda v. Kalinski, 45 N.Y.S.2d 387 (App. Div. 1982) (holding invalid a portion
of a shareholders' agreement which did not contain a cure provision without citation to either Zion
or Adler).
254. See Westland Capitol Corp. v. Lucht Eng'g, Inc., 308 N.W.2d 709 (Minn. 1981).
255. See supra notes 15-27.
256. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 3400(b) (Deering 1985); MINN. STAT. § 302A.457 (1984);
CLOSE CORP. SuPP., supra note 8, at § 20. These statutes require the agreement to be unanimous.
257. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
258. See Galler v. Galler, 32 Ill. 2d at 30; Westland Capital Corp. v. Lucht Eng'g, Inc., 308
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governing the enforceability of private contracts. 259
The shareholder control agreement should be contained in a writing
signed by all shareholders who are intended to be bound by it.2 ° The
agreement should specify appropriate durational limits. 261  A stock
transfer restriction designed to ensure that transferees of the shares cov-
ered by the agreement become bound by the agreement should also be
included.262 The share certificates of parties to the shareholder control
agreement should bear a legend disclosing the existence of the agreement
and a copy of the agreement should be filed with the corporation so that
shareholders and other appropriate persons may inspect it.263 Although
the case law has yet to develop the principle that the shareholders are
subject to liabilities otherwise imposed upon directors whenever a control
agreement limits the usual discretion of the board, most statutory provi-
sions do impose that liability,2 64 and the parties to the agreement should
anticipate judicial imposition of such liability. In Model Act jurisdic-
tions which lack recent precedent authorizing control agreements, inclu-
sion of a provision in the shareholder control agreement specifically
accepting such liability strengthens the claim that the agreement is
valid.265 Whenever the agreement requires the corporation to take or re-
NW.2d at 714; Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. at 417; 1 F. O'NEAL, supra note 6 § 5.24. The limitations
on a common law control agreement are the same as those governing optional provisions in the
articles. See supra note 79. Under the modern view, most statutory requirements are imposed for
the protection of the shareholders; if those shareholders agree to waive the requirements, the courts
do not interfere. See Z. CAVITCH, supra note 17, at § 114.01[3].
259. Johnson, supra note 22, at 216, states:
The distinction between valid and invalid agreements... depends on whether the agree-
ment has caused harm to others. The drafting attorney must fashion the document so that
there is no injury, either real or apparent, to the corporation or to third parties. Agree-
ments among shareholders are generally the product of negotiation, and should be con-
strued and enforced like any other contract so as to give effect to the intent of the parties as
expressed in their agreements, except where they violate a statute; contemplate an illegality;
involve fraud, oppression or wrong against others; or are made through self-dealing or
duress. Care must be taken to insure that such agreements, like any other contract, do not
stray into these prohibited areas.
See also Bulloch, supra note 217.
260. Whenever possible, all shareholders should be parties to the control agreement. F.
O'NEAL, supra note 6, at § 5.24.
261. See supra note 222.
262. See supra note 223.
263. Filing and notice requirements are contained in most statutory safe harbors. See, e.g.,
MINN. STAT. § 302A.457 subd. 2(b) (1984). See also supra note 90.
264. CAL. CORP. CODE § 300(d) (Deering 1985); MINN. STAT. § 302A.45 subd. 3 (1984);
MODEL ACT, supra note 3, at § 8.01.
265. There appears to be little risk from inclusion of this provision because most liabilities of
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frain from taking certain actions, the corporation should become a party
to the agreement. 2 " A shareholder control agreement can be specifically
enforced,267 corporate actions in derogation of the agreement may be
cancelled,268 or contract damages may be sought as appropriate in the
particular case.
As in the case of a shareholder voting agreement, a control agreement
may provide for specific results or set forth a mechanism for determining
board or corporate action with respect to various issues. A shareholder
control agreement may contain provisions dealing with the following
matters.
L No business or activities of the corporation shall be conducted
without the unanimous consent of the shareholders or,
alternatively, the consent of a specified shareholder.
This provision gives each shareholder veto power over corporate ac-
tion of all types.26 9 It allows the close corporation to operate in the same
manner as a partnership, but a potential for causing deadlock among the
shareholders also exists. For this reason it may be appropriate to limit
the requirement to "material" decisions which are defined in a manner
which meets the specific needs of the corporation. An alternative provi-
sion might provide that a specified shareholder is to have final authority
over certain corporate activities, such as marketing or research and de-
velopment. Where the entrepreneurs' skills are clearly divided into sub-
ject areas and they enter the venture because of these skills, this provision
may be appropriate. Although this type of provision is not subject to the
deadlock potential of an unaniminity requirement, it presents other
problems. For example, the specified shareholder's business skills may
diminish over time. Therefore, it is appropriate to consider providing for
a high vote override of the shareholder's authority which triggers a fair
price buy-out of that shareholder. This would allow the other sharehold-
ers to take control but would impose a deterrent to unwarranted action.
directors qua directors run to the shareholders, all of whom ordinarily will be parties to the
agreement.
266. Compare MINN. STAT. § 302A.457 (1984) (inclusion of a nonshareholder as a party
removes the agreement from the statutory safe harbor of subdivision I while leaving available the
common law of shareholder's agreement pursuant to subdivision 4).
267. Galler v. Galler, 32 Ill.2d 16 (1965).
268. Westland Capital Corp. v. Lucht Eng'g Inc., 308 N.W.2d 709 (Minn. 1981).
269. See Zion v. Kurtz, 50 N.Y.2d 92, 428 N.Y.S.2d 199, 405 N.E.2d 681 (1980); Adler v.
Svingos, 436 N.Y.S.2d 719 (App. Div. 1981).
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2. Designate the individuals who will serve as the officers of the
corporation and fix their compensation.
Shareholders inevitably wish to hold positions of power with regard to
the corporation and its operations.27 ° In many instances corporate titles
and relative salaries are the first items the entrepreneurs decide after en-
tering the venture. Salaries may be fixed by specifying a dollar amount
or providing a ratio among the various officerships. The shareholder's
agreement should provide for periodic review of salaries or the bench-
mark amount if ratios are used. The shareholder should be expressly
required to negotiate in good faith concerning appropriate modifications.
The shareholder control agreement may incorporate employment con-
tracts between the shareholder-officers and the corporation. 271 If it is
anticipated that those who succeed to a shareholder's stock will also suc-
ceed to that shareholder's position with respect to the corporation, a pro-
vision should be made for so designating the successor.
3. Restrict corporate expenditures, for example, for capital items or
employment of highly compensated persons, and borrowing.
These provisions are always found in venture capital agreements and
they should also be included in shareholder control agreements to ensure
that corporate funds and credit are properly used for the benefit of all
shareholders.272 With regard to expenditures which are related to the
corporation's business and operations, a consent restriction cannot be ex-
ercised in an unreasonable manner.273
4. Set policy regarding corporate distributions of money or property
to shareholders.
When some shareholders are inactive in the business, the required pay-
ment of dividends may be necessary to ensure them a fair current return
on their investment. Dividends may be determined as a percentage of net
earnings or by linking them to the salaries paid to various corporate of-
270. See supra note 161. The meaning of a particular corporate "title" in terms of power and
responsibility should be clearly spelled out in the bylaws. See supra notes 185-88 and accompanying
text.
271. See F. O'NEAL, supra note 6, at § 6.11; Kesler, Employment Agreements in Close Corpora-
tions, II SETON HALL L. REV. 187 (1980).
272. A good example of such an agreement is contained in Westland Capital Corp. v. Lucht
Eng'g, Inc., 308 N.W.2d 709 (Minn. 1981).
273. Westland Capital Corp. v. Lucht Eng'g, Inc., 308 N.W.2d at 714.
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ficers. Where dividends will not be paid to all shareholders, several
classes of common stock may be desirable.
5. Include provisions for arbitration of disputes, severability, cure,
and survival.
If a separate shareholder control agreement is prepared, these matters
must be included in it as well as any shareholder voting agreement.274
V. THE LIMITS OF PLANNING
All planning can fail as the facts change, new parties enter the scene,
or relationships break down. Therefore, good draftsmanship does not
eliminate the need for judicial intervention. Common law principles and
statutory provisions providing relief to shareholders who have been sub-
jected to mistreatment--"oppression" or "unfairly prejudicial con-
duct"-remain relevant to ensure that good faith and fair and reasonable
treatment of shareholders is the standard within the corporation, while
the "morals of the marketplace" and ordinary business ethics are the
only limitations on the controlling shareholders' actions externally. 275
Good planning is nevertheless important because the parties' state-
ment of their "deal" will provide direction for judicial analysis when in-
tervention is sought. The shareholders can define their precise
expectations under various foreseeable circumstances; specifically de-
lineating their relationship to one another regarding the corporation.
They can set their own parameters for honest, fair, and reasonable con-
duct in their dealings. The more extensive and precise the planning, the
more certain the result when the shareholders' agreement is applied to
the actual circumstances existing when judicial intervention becomes
necessary.
274. See supra notes 250-53 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 31-41 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX
Prior to undertaking representation, we were informed:
(1) that there are potentially differing legal interests among ourselves
(as individual participants);
(2) that as a minority party to the proposed transaction, each of us is
exposed to possible disagreement with and control by those in the
majority;
(3) that the attorney will endeavor, at each stage in the negotiations, to
point out the advantages and disadvantages of alternate courses of ac-
tion on each of us;
(4) that neither the attorney-client privilege nor the client-lawyer con-
fidentiality duty exists with respect to information acquired by the at-
torney relating to representation of the group;
(5) that if a severe conflict develops between us, the attorney may be
required to withdraw from representation of the group, in which case
he may be unable to represent any of us as to that issue; and
(6) that each of us may at any time, without prejudice, seek independ-
ent advice or representation, on a specific issue or on our relationship
as a whole, from another attorney of our individual choice.
After consideration of the above disclosures, we agree:
(1) that our legal interests vary only slightly and are not in actual
conflict;
(2) that our common goals are the predominant factor in our business
relationship;
(3) that we desire the attorney's efforts to be directed toward assisting
us, as a group, to'best adjust our individual interests so as to achieve
our common economic goal and we accept any limitations such direc-
tion may cause in his representation of each of us.
Therefore, we each consent to multiple representation of all of us, as a
group, by the attorney and the firm.
(Sample only. Do not use unless this
form meets, in your professional judg-
ment, the needs of your potential
clients.)
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